Financial stability review - March 2013 by unknown
Contents
 Overview 1
1. The Global Financial Environment 5
2. The Australian Financial System 19 
 Box A: Australian Bank Activity in Asia 36
3. Business and Household Balance Sheets 39 
 Box B: The Financial Condition of  
 Companies Servicing the Mining Sector 51
4. Developments in the Financial System Architecture 55
 Copyright and Disclaimer Notices 65
Financial 
Stability 
Review
maRCh 2013
The material in this Financial Stability Review was finalised on 26 March 2013.
The Financial Stability Review is published semiannually in March and September. 
It is available on the Reserve Bank’s website (www.rba.gov.au).
Financial Stability Review enquiries
Information Department
Telephone: (612) 9551 9830
Facsimile: (612) 9551 8033
Email: rbainfo@rba.gov.au
ISSN 1449-3896 (Print)
ISSN 1449-5260 (Online)
1financial stability review |  m a r c h  2013
Global financial conditions have improved 
significantly since the previous Financial Stability 
Review, despite the new uncertainty created by the 
proposed sovereign bailout for Cyprus in the past few 
weeks. Some earlier European policy initiatives had 
been seen as demonstrating a strong commitment 
to deal with the region’s sovereign debt and banking 
sector problems while maintaining the monetary 
union, and this boosted confidence over much of 
the past six months. Confidence was also enhanced 
by further signs of recovery in some of the major 
economies, notably the United States, supported by 
continued monetary stimulus. The improvement in 
global financial market sentiment has contributed 
to a rally in risk assets across a range of markets, 
consistent with increased risk appetite.
The improvement in market confidence has helped 
ease sovereign financing pressures for a number of 
euro area countries that had been subject to the 
greatest concerns about debt sustainability. Given 
the links between sovereign and bank balance 
sheets, this had positive spillovers to bank funding 
markets in the region. The euro area nonetheless 
still faces significant challenges to its stability. 
Many banks, particularly in the periphery, are still 
experiencing elevated funding costs, deteriorating 
asset performance and weak profitability amid 
subdued economic and property market conditions. 
This has contributed to tight credit conditions in the 
region as banks continue to deleverage and reduce 
their balance sheet risks.
Given the unresolved vulnerabilities, it is too early to 
say whether the improved market sentiment over 
the past six months is the beginning of a sustained 
recovery, or merely a temporary upswing. Much 
will depend on the European authorities’ ability to 
implement the policy actions needed to restore 
confidence in debt sustainability and repair banking 
sectors, while also fostering a recovery in economic 
activity. In this context, the renewed market tension 
associated with the handling of the sovereign 
and banking crisis in Cyprus in recent weeks has 
provided a reminder of the political, economic and 
social challenges of resolving the pervasive fiscal and 
banking sector problems.
Outside the euro area, confidence in the major 
banking systems has also generally improved from 
six months ago, as evidenced by strong gains in bank 
share prices that have often exceeded the rise in 
broader share market indices. Even so, these banking 
systems are still at varying stages of their recoveries 
from the global financial crisis; subdued profitability 
and elevated non-performing loan ratios associated 
with slow economic activity and property markets 
continue to feature in many banking systems. Issues 
around loan forbearance and banks’ asset valuations 
are also areas of concern in some countries.
Elsewhere, in countries that have been more 
resilient to the crisis, such as many in Asia, banking 
systems remain in a relatively strong position. 
Some of these countries, however, are beginning 
to confront a different set of challenges associated 
with property market and credit expansions. It is 
normal for the effects of low interest rates to be 
evident in asset prices and credit before they can 
be seen in economic growth and inflation, and 
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hence a prolonged period of low rates can result in 
a build-up of credit risk long before inflation starts 
to rise. In some countries, particularly those with 
limited exchange rate flexibility and strong capital 
inflows, the authorities have sought to contain 
these risks through macroprudential measures. 
These policy measures have had to be progressively 
tightened in a few cases in response to continuing 
credit and property market exuberance, illustrating 
some of the challenges involved in calibrating and 
targeting these policies.
The Australian banking system also remains in a 
relatively strong position. The improvement in global 
market sentiment since the middle of 2012 has, at 
the margin, eased wholesale funding costs for the 
large Australian banks, with bank bond spreads 
declining to around their lowest levels since the 
start of the crisis. The banks have been continuing 
to limit their use of wholesale funding in any case, 
and deposit growth has been outpacing growth in 
credit. Continued strong competition for deposits 
has seen spreads on retail deposits remain around 
historically high levels even as spreads on long-term 
wholesale debt have narrowed significantly over 
recent months.
The banks have collectively continued to record 
strong profits in recent periods, helping them 
to strengthen their capital positions further and 
putting them in a good position to meet the Basel III 
capital requirements that began to be introduced 
in Australia this year. The banking sector’s asset 
performance has also been improving, though at 
a gradual pace due to the challenging conditions 
being experienced in some parts of the Australian 
and UK business sectors. With domestic demand 
for credit likely to remain moderate in coming years, 
banks are increasingly pursuing other strategies to 
underpin their profit growth over the medium term, 
such as efficiency improvements and expansion in 
the Asian region. While this remains an area to watch, 
there is little sign at this stage that banks have been 
motivated to take on excessive risk or strain their risk 
management capabilities.
Profitability in the general insurance industry was 
strong in the past year and the industry remains well 
capitalised. Underwriting results improved in a more 
benign claims environment following the sequence 
of catastrophe-related claims events in 2011. The 
natural disasters in Australia early this year are not 
expected to have a major financial effect on insurers.
A period of balance sheet consolidation has 
helped mitigate potential risks to financial stability 
emanating from the non-financial sectors in Australia. 
Even though the economy has been expanding at 
around trend rates, some firms have been facing 
challenges from the high exchange rate and a 
return to more traditional saving and borrowing 
behaviour by households. Consequently, business 
failure rates have been above average, which has 
contributed to the slow pace of recovery in banks’ 
non-performing business loans over recent years; 
that said, the vast majority of firms are still meeting 
their debt commitments. Overall, gearing ratios are 
low and deleveraging is continuing in some parts 
of the business sector, which is helping to limit the 
effects of subdued activity and profitability in some 
industries.
Households’ net wealth has been rising recently due 
to the recovery in housing and other asset markets 
as well as continued higher saving and borrowing 
restraint. Many households still prefer to repay 
existing debt rather than take on new debt, which 
has contributed to the slower pace of household 
credit growth and an increase in mortgage 
prepayment buffers. Debt-servicing capacity has also 
been boosted by lower interest rates. Despite the 
unemployment rate having drifted up a bit over the 
past year, housing loan arrears and other aggregate 
measures of financial stress in the household sector 
remain low. Household indebtedness and gearing 
are nonetheless still at historically high levels, and 
hence continuation of the household sector’s more 
prudent approach to borrowing would assist in 
strengthening the sector’s financial resilience.
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At the international level, policy development 
work has been progressing on a number of 
fronts, including addressing the risks posed by 
systemically important financial institutions and 
strengthening the oversight of shadow banking 
systems. As foreshadowed in the previous Review, 
the International Monetary Fund released its 
Financial Sector Assessment Program report on 
Australia in late 2012, which contained a positive 
overall assessment of financial system stability and 
supervisory standards in Australia. This report made 
a number of recommendations that are being 
considered by the relevant CFR agencies.  R
After the fast pace of international regulatory 
reforms in the past few years, there has been more 
focus recently on implementation of the agreed 
reforms at the national level (particularly the Basel III 
capital standards) and monitoring the consistency 
of implementation internationally through various 
assessments and peer reviews. In Australia, the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
finalised its implementation of the Basel III capital 
framework, which it began phasing in from the 
beginning of this year. APRA will shortly resume 
consultation on the Australian implementation of the 
Basel III liquidity reforms after a number of changes 
were made to the international standard earlier this 
year. Legislation was recently passed that will help 
Australia meet its G20 commitment to move toward 
greater central clearing and reporting of over-the-
counter derivatives transactions. The members of 
the Council of Financial Regulators (CFR) have been 
continuing their work on strengthening Australia’s 
financial sector crisis resolution arrangements, 
building on international best practice, with 
a particular focus recently on financial market 
infrastructures.
4 ReseRve bank of austRalia
5financial stability review |  m a r c h  2013
1. The Global Financial Environment
Despite the recent uncertainty associated with the 
handling of the sovereign bailout of Cyprus, global 
financial conditions have improved overall since the 
September Review. In large part, this reflects various 
policy developments in Europe that had generally 
strengthened market perceptions of the ability of the 
euro area to deal with its sovereign debt and banking 
sector problems while keeping the monetary union 
intact. Prices of peripheral euro area sovereign bonds 
and euro area bank shares have risen since the middle 
of 2012, despite falls in recent weeks. More broadly, 
prices for a wide range of other risk assets globally 
have risen, including bank share prices in a number 
of other countries, implying that risk appetite has 
increased (Graph 1.1). Together with the improved 
sentiment towards Europe, the partial resolution of the 
US ‘fiscal cliff’ around the turn of the year and further 
signs of recovery in some of the major economies 
have boosted confidence in recent months.
Even though sentiment has improved, the euro area 
still faces significant challenges to its stability from 
fiscal and banking sector problems. Political and 
policy implementation risks also cloud the outlook 
for economic growth and financial stability in the 
region. The negotiations over the rescue package 
for Cyprus in recent weeks highlight the problems 
some euro area countries are still facing and the 
challenges of resolving them. Accordingly, it is too 
early to tell whether the improvement in market 
sentiment is the beginning of a sustained recovery, 
or merely a temporary upswing; since the onset of 
the global financial crisis, there have been a number 
of periods of optimism which ultimately turned out 
to be short-lived as financial markets refocused on 
unresolved underlying problems.
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Graph 1.1
The Euro area Crisis and Sovereign 
Debt markets
There were a number of developments over the past 
few quarters that helped boost confidence towards 
the euro area, with positive spillovers for global 
market sentiment. The European Central Bank’s 
(ECB’s) announcement of its Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) program in September, even 
though it has yet to be activated, was pivotal in 
reassuring markets that the ECB would do all that 
it can to preserve the euro. Under this program, 
the ECB would purchase sovereign debt of euro 
area countries that are meeting the terms of their 
European Union (EU) assistance programs but still 
facing significant financing pressures, with the aim 
of bringing down sovereign borrowing costs for 
these countries and safeguarding the monetary 
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transmission mechanism in the euro area. When it 
was announced, it was widely expected that Spain 
would request a full EU assistance program in order 
to qualify for OMT. However, the implicit support 
provided by OMT has brought down Spanish 
sovereign bond yields and so far avoided the need 
for the country to go down this route. More recently, 
Ireland and Portugal – which are already on EU 
assistance programs – have successfully auctioned 
sovereign bonds, thereby moving closer to ‘full 
market access’ which is another precondition for 
OMT purchases.
After protracted negotiations, the EU, ECB and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed to 
adjust Greece’s aid program and debt position in 
late November. The interest rate charged on loans 
extended by other euro area nations was lowered, 
the maturity of existing loans was extended and 
a buyback of Greek bonds held by private sector 
investors was carried out. These adjustments, along 
with agreed fiscal and structural reforms, were 
designed to put Greece’s sovereign debt position 
on a more sustainable path. However, there is still 
considerable doubt about whether Greece can meet 
its new fiscal targets, particularly given the country’s 
weak economic performance.
In Spain, an independent stress test of the banking 
system completed in late September provided 
greater clarity about the size of capital shortfalls, 
estimating the public cost of bank recapitalisation 
at around €40  billion (considerably lower than the 
€100  billion that was potentially available from 
the EU). The recapitalisation of troubled banks 
commenced in December, together with the 
transfer of problem loans to a newly created ‘bad 
bank’. Though these measures appear to have 
restored some confidence and improved funding 
conditions, Spain’s weak economy and property 
market conditions are still creating a challenging 
environment for many of its banks.
At the European level, broad agreement has been 
reached on the implementation of a single bank 
supervisory mechanism, expected to come into 
effect in about a year. The ECB will have ultimate 
responsibility for supervising all euro area banks, 
although it will directly supervise only the largest 
banks in each country, delegating supervision 
of the others to national supervisors. Under this 
new supervisory framework, it is expected that 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM), the euro 
area’s permanent bailout fund, will be able to 
directly recapitalise banks that experience losses 
in the future. However, there has been opposition 
from some countries to allowing the ESM alone 
to recapitalise euro area banks that have had to 
write down legacy assets, with the suggestion that 
national governments be required to boost these 
banks’ capital before they receive any funds from 
the ESM. If the ESM were to be limited in this way, it 
could make the single supervisory mechanism less 
effective at reducing the destabilising link between 
sovereign and bank balance sheets.
More recently, there has been an increase in market 
uncertainty associated with the handling of an 
EU/IMF rescue package for Cyprus, which will be 
the fourth euro area country to receive such a 
package since the sovereign debt crisis began. 
To prevent Cyprus’ sovereign debt burden rising 
to an unsustainable level, the EU and IMF had 
insisted that the country mobilise around €6 billion 
of internal resources to go with their €10 billion 
loan. Initially, there was a proposal to do this via a 
one-off ‘tax’ on deposits in Cypriot banks, including 
on deposits under €100 000 that were covered by 
a deposit guarantee scheme, though this was met 
with widespread opposition. Following further 
negotiations, an alternative approach was agreed 
in recent days in which insured depositors would 
be protected but uninsured depositors and other 
bank creditors would face large losses as part of a 
significant restructuring and downsizing of the 
country’s banking system. Even though it did not go 
ahead, the unusual step of proposing a haircut on 
insured deposits could in the future raise concerns 
about the credibility of other EU deposit guarantees.
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Euro Area Government 10-year Bond Spreads
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Graph 1.3Even though the euro area economy remains 
weak, the ECB’s commitments and other policy 
developments have generally bolstered investor 
confidence in euro area periphery government 
bonds, allowing spreads on these bonds to narrow 
(Graph 1.2). While spreads have widened again 
somewhat in response to recent events such as the 
inconclusive Italian election and the Cyprus bailout, 
the reaction has so far been limited, with peripheral 
bond yields still significantly lower than they were in 
the middle of 2012.
The easing of concerns about a possible break-up 
of the euro area since the middle of last year has 
also helped staunch some of the capital outflows 
from the troubled euro area economies that had 
been evident over the previous year or so, though 
financial fragmentation in the region is still greater 
than before. Since the September Review, safe- 
haven deposit flows from peripheral economies 
into Germany have slowed considerably and some 
countries, Greece in particular, have experienced a 
notable repatriation of domestic deposits (Graph 1.3). 
Foreign holdings of sovereign bonds issued by some 
troubled countries, such as Spain, have increased in 
recent quarters, after declining over the previous year.
Outside of the euro area, government bond yields 
in most advanced economies have been relatively 
steady, or up a little at the long end of the yield 
curve, over the past six months. Although yields 
remain low and other indicators of demand for safer 
sovereign assets strong, some of these governments 
have nonetheless tightened fiscal policy to address 
their high debt levels. If the fiscal adjustment is 
front-loaded, it could stymie the economic recoveries 
in those countries, which would make the task of 
repairing bank balance sheets more difficult. In this 
respect, the partial resolution of the ‘fiscal cliff ’ in the 
United States was a positive development in that 
it averted a significant near-term tightening. While 
some automatic spending cuts did commence in 
March, they are not anticipated to be severe enough 
to derail the emerging recovery.
In the United Kingdom, however, fiscal tightening 
has been quite extensive and this might have had 
a greater effect on economic growth. Given that 
the profitability of UK banks has been lower than 
at banks in some other non-euro area advanced 
economies (see below), the implications of weaker 
growth for the financial system could also be 
greater. Although Moody’s downgrade of the United 
Kingdom’s sovereign credit rating in February had 
little lasting effect on UK bond yields, sovereign 
yields more generally remain sensitive to political 
or other shocks. Since many financial institutions 
are highly exposed to the debt of their sovereign, 
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a sudden large increase in yields would impose 
significant losses on banks, insurance companies 
and pension funds.
Bank Funding Conditions and 
markets
The improvement in global market sentiment 
over recent quarters has been reflected in easier 
funding conditions for many euro area banks. 
Spreads on short-term unsecured interbank loans 
are now around their lowest levels since mid 2007, 
and differentiation in spreads across banks has 
narrowed as perceptions of relative credit quality 
have converged somewhat (Graph 1.4). Secured 
(repo) lending rates have drifted above zero in recent 
months, after being slightly negative for most of the 
second half of last year. The volume of interbank 
lending remains low, however, partly because many 
banks are still flush with central bank funding, despite 
repayments by some. Around €240  billion out of 
a total of around €1 trillion in three-year funding 
provided by the ECB in late 2011 and early 2012 
was repaid early by euro area banks. Data on ECB 
lending by country indicate that banks from France, 
Germany and Spain accounted for a significant share 
of the early repayments.
Euro area banks’ access to term funding markets has 
also improved since the middle of 2012. Yields on 
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Despite the reduction in yields, euro area bank bond 
issuance has remained subdued in recent months, 
partly because weak asset growth has limited 
banks’ financing needs. Euro area banks have issued 
around €165 billion in bonds since October last year 
(Graph 1.6). This is well down on the issuance 
levels seen in the first half of 2012, though a large 
part of that earlier issuance was retained within 
the banking sector to provide it with additional 
collateral for central bank funding; there has been 
less of this collateral-driven issuance recently as 
banks have been reducing their reliance on central 
bank financing. Covered bonds have accounted for 
a smaller share of recent bank bond issuance than 
was the case in early 2012, consistent with improved 
market appetite for unsecured debt. In line with 
weak economic activity, euro area banks’ aggregate 
bonds issued by euro area banks have declined over 
this period and differences in the borrowing rates 
faced by individual banks have narrowed, though 
peripheral banks continue to face a sizeable premium 
compared with banks from the core countries. Euro 
area bank bond yields are now around the same 
levels as bond yields for similarly rated non-financial 
corporates, after having been above them for 
the past few years, which is consistent with the 
perceptions of reduced default risk among banks 
(Graph 1.5).
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outstanding deposits have been contracting in 
recent quarters, despite the recent increases in 
deposits in some of the region’s most troubled 
economies (discussed above).
Bank funding conditions in the major banking 
systems outside the euro area have continued to 
improve, with bank bond yields falling further over 
the past six months. Nonetheless, bond issuance 
by banks is still generally subdued by historical 
standards. Partly this reflects slow credit growth 
in these economies, but many banks have also 
been continuing to increase the share of their 
funding from customer deposits. Some banks 
have been trying to reduce their reliance on 
market-based sources of funding that are perceived 
to be less stable. The shift towards deposit funding 
is also likely to have been partly demand driven, 
as investors have been attracted to the safety of 
deposit insurance in a more uncertain and volatile 
global financial environment. In the United States, 
for example, temporary unlimited coverage of 
non-interest bearing deposits had been in place 
between October 2008 and end 2012, coinciding 
with a period in which banks’ non-interest bearing 
deposits increased substantially; a combined cap of 
US$250 000 per depositor was reinstated from the 
beginning of this year.
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Banks’ Profitability and Capital
Profits of the large banks in most of the major 
advanced economies increased last year, though 
returns on equity generally remain well below 
pre-crisis averages (Graph 1.7). In the euro area, 
aggregate return on equity for the largest banks 
increased to around 1¼ per cent in 2012 after being 
slightly negative in 2011. Much of this increase came 
from improved trading income in the latter part 
of the year, and the absence of special factors that 
had affected performance in 2011, such as goodwill 
charges at large Italian banks and writedowns on 
holdings of Greek debt. Underlying profitability in 
the euro area is still being weighed down, though, by 
weak asset performance, balance sheet contraction 
and narrow net interest margins. In the United 
Kingdom, weak net interest income and significant 
legal costs arising from earlier inappropriate business 
practices, notably the mis-selling of payment 
protection insurance, have continued to weigh on 
the large banks’ profits; aggregate return on equity 
for the five largest UK banks was close to zero in 
2012, down from 3 per cent in 2011.
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While the profitability of US banks has improved over 
recent years, profit growth has been limited by the 
slow recovery of the US economy and, in a number 
of cases, ongoing legal expenses associated with 
the resolution of previous poor mortgage practices. 
Muted credit growth and narrower net interest 
margins associated with the prolonged low interest 
rate environment have also weighed on banks’ net 
interest income. Loan-loss provisions have now 
broadly stabilised after falling over the previous few 
years. Across all institutions insured by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the United 
States, the share of loss-making institutions declined 
to 14  per cent in the December quarter of 2012, 
down from 20 per cent the year before, but above 
the pre-crisis average of about 6 per cent.
Most large banks in the major banking systems have 
continued to strengthen their capital positions over 
the past year in response to market and regulatory 
pressures (Graph 1.8). On a pre-Basel III basis, 
aggregate Tier  1 capital ratios of large banks are 
now at least 12 per cent in all of the major banking 
systems, a significant increase from the levels of 
around 8  per cent that were common before the 
crisis. The large Swiss and Nordic banks have been 
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subjected to capital requirements that are notably 
higher than those in some other jurisdictions.
In the euro area, the large banks increased their 
aggregate Tier  1 capital ratio by a little over 
1  percentage point over the year to December, to 
12 per cent, mainly by reducing their risk-weighted 
assets. There remains a large degree of dispersion, 
though, as some euro area banks are still struggling 
to accumulate capital due to their low profitability 
and equity valuations. Accordingly, a number of 
them have needed to be recapitalised in recent 
months, especially in the troubled peripheral 
economies. As noted, the Spanish banking sector 
is undergoing considerable restructuring, with the 
four state-controlled banks receiving public capital 
injections in December and recapitalisations of a 
number of other Spanish banks having occurred 
in March. In accordance with Greece’s EU/IMF aid 
program, the four major Greek banks are expected 
to be recapitalised soon, while the Italian bank 
Monte dei Paschi di Siena recently received its 
second injection of government capital. Public 
interventions have also occurred in a number of 
other countries: SNS Reaal (the fourth-largest bank in 
the Netherlands) was nationalised in early February 
and Dexia received its second capital injection from 
the Belgian and French governments in December.
As their profitability is still generally subdued, banks 
have sought to bolster their retained earnings and 
therefore capital by limiting their dividend payouts. 
For example, many banks in Europe (including the 
United Kingdom) are still paying little or no dividends 
to common shareholders, as their profitability 
remains weak and some are yet to fully repay public 
capital received during the crisis (Graph  1.9). By 
contrast, dividends paid by large banks in the United 
States have been increasing for the past couple of 
years as their profitability has recovered, though 
they remain well below pre-crisis levels and the 
resulting payout ratios are below average. Some 
large US banks have recently announced plans to 
further increase their capital distributions (through 
higher dividends and/or share buybacks) following 
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models. This has prompted a number of global and 
country-level initiatives to improve the reliability 
and consistency of banks’ risk-weight calculations 
(see the ’Developments in the Financial System 
Architecture’ chapter). As discussed further below, a 
few European jurisdictions are also concerned that 
their banks may be forbearing on problem loans and 
that these banks’ capital positions may weaken if 
economic conditions do not recover as anticipated.
Investor scepticism over banks’ asset valuations may 
be one factor explaining the persistently low equity 
valuations of euro area banks. The price-to-book ratio 
– the market valuation of equity compared with the 
book valuation – remains well below 1 for euro area 
banks, despite increasing since the first half of 2012 
(Graph 1.10). Low equity valuations may also reflect 
investors’ expectations that banks’ profitability will 
remain subdued and/or an additional risk premium 
to compensate for heightened uncertainty. While 
the price-to-book ratios for US and UK banks had 
also been below 1 for much of the past two years, 
they have recently been much closer to 1, consistent 
with the improved investor sentiment towards these 
banks.
Looking ahead, banks’ capital positions will also 
come under pressure as the new Basel III bank capital 
standards come into full effect. Implementation of 
the new standards, which was due to begin this year, 
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the latest round of supervisory stress tests. The US 
Federal Reserve approved most large US banks’ 
capital plans, though JP Morgan and Goldman Sachs 
received conditional approval owing to apparent 
weaknesses in their capital planning processes; 
these two institutions will be required to resubmit 
their plans by the end of September.
Another way banks have been able to increase 
their regulatory capital ratios is by reducing their 
risk-weighted assets, such as by allowing asset 
portfolios to run off or by selling them completely. 
This kind of deleveraging has been particularly 
notable among euro area banks over the past year 
given the greater difficulties these banks have had 
increasing their capital. Across the major banking 
systems, reductions in risk-weighted assets over the 
past few years have coincided with a steady fall in 
average risk weights. In repairing their balance sheets, 
banks have tended to shed non-core assets with 
above-average risk weights, and have increased their 
holdings of lower-risk securities, such as government 
bonds, which will help them meet forthcoming 
liquidity requirements under Basel III. There have 
been concerns, however, that some banks may be 
overstating their reported capital positions by using 
overly optimistic assumptions in their internal risk 
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Credit Conditions and asset Quality
Reflecting weak economic activity and market 
pressures on banks, credit conditions have remained 
tight in the euro area in recent quarters. Despite 
banks reporting some improvement in their access 
to funding, the ECB’s bank lending survey showed 
that a net balance of euro area banks continued to 
tighten their business and household loan standards 
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in the September and December quarters last year 
(Graph 1.12). The survey also showed that credit 
demand had fallen further, though this was partly 
because some larger businesses were substituting 
towards (relatively inexpensive) non-intermediated 
debt financing. Aggregate euro area credit 
contracted slightly over the year to January, as 
modest (and declining) growth in household credit 
was more than offset by a fall in business credit. 
The contraction in credit has been particularly 
pronounced in the more troubled economies in the 
region, particularly in Greece, Portugal and Spain. The 
pick-up in corporate bond issuance in the euro area 
since 2011 has been notable, particularly given that 
the euro area has traditionally been more reliant on 
intermediated finance. That said, smaller businesses 
generally do not have access to alternative sources 
of finance and so a continuation of tight lending 
conditions could impede economic activity.
Despite there being no change in the ECB policy 
rate since July, there was a further reduction in 
interest rates on new housing and business loans 
in the second half of 2012, including in the troubled 
peripheral economies (Graph 1.13). The reduction 
in rates has unwound some of the divergence in 
lending rates between the core and peripheral 
economies that had opened up over the past few 
years. Even so, businesses in France and Germany 
was recently delayed in Europe (including the United 
Kingdom) and the United States. Even so, most of the 
large global banks have started reporting their capital 
ratios on a Basel III basis. The Basel III common equity 
Tier 1 capital ratio, which includes stricter definitions 
of common equity and higher risk weights, is about 
2½  percentage points lower for these banks on 
average compared with current definitions. They all 
have a ratio above 7 per cent though, according to 
their most recent reports, and therefore are above 
the minimum that will eventually be required under 
the Basel III framework (Graph 1.11). However, many 
of these banks will need to improve their common 
equity positions further, partly to meet the extra 
capital buffers that will be required of them for being 
systemically important.
13financial stability review |  m a r c h  2013
Euro Area
Spain
Portugal
Netherlands
Italy
Ireland
Greece*
Germany
France
Finland
Cyprus
Belgium
Austria
0 2 4 6
Average Interest Rates on New Corporate Loans
%
n December 2010
* Average interest rate on outstanding corporate loans
Source: ECB
u June 2012 l January 2013
Graph 1.13
0
2
4
6
0
2
4
6
Large Banks’ Non-performing Loans*
Share of loans
US
20122008 20102006
%
Other Europe
UK
Canada
Euro area
%
Australia
* Definitions of ‘non-performing’ differ across jurisdictions, and in some
cases exclude loans that are 90+ days past due but well secured;
includes 18 large US banks, 52 large institutions from across the euro
area, 13 large other European banks, four largest UK banks, the six largest
Canadian banks and the four largest Australian banks; latest available data
used where banks have not reported for December 2012; reporting periods
vary across jurisdictions
 Sources: APRA; RBA; SNL Financial; banks’ annual and interim reports
Graph 1.14
continue to face lending rates around 1 percentage 
point less than those in Ireland, Italy and Spain and 
about 3 percentage points less than in Greece and 
Portugal. With the exception of Spain, mortgage rates 
in the southern periphery are also still considerably 
above those in Germany.
A further deterioration in euro area banks’ asset 
performance over 2012, associated with weakening 
economic activity, is one factor that has been 
contributing to the tight credit conditions in that 
region. The aggregate non-performing loan (NPL) 
ratio of the large euro area banks is estimated to have 
risen to about 7½ per cent at the end of 2012, up 
from about 2¼ per cent in mid 2007, driven by banks 
in the most troubled countries, as well as those with 
significant exposure to the Spanish property market 
(Graph 1.14). Particularly large increases of more than 
2 percentage points over the year were recorded in 
the NPL ratios for a number of banks based in Cyprus, 
Ireland, Italy and Spain (information about NPL 
developments at Greek banks is limited). The two 
largest Spanish banks, which are more geographically 
diversified than their smaller counterparts, reported 
only modest increases in their NPL ratios over 2012.
Outside the euro area, credit has also contracted 
in the United Kingdom over the past year. To 
improve the availability of credit, the UK authorities 
introduced a ‘Funding for Lending Scheme’ in 
July last year which provides access to lower-cost 
funding for banks that expand their lending to 
the real economy. Although nearly £14  billion was 
borrowed under the scheme during the December 
quarter 2012, lending by scheme participants still 
contracted by £2½  billion over the same period. 
However, a fall in borrowing costs and an increase 
in credit over January suggests that the scheme may 
have gained more traction this year. Credit growth in 
the United States remains subdued, as an ongoing 
contraction in housing credit has partly offset faster 
growth in business and consumer credit.
Asset performance in the major banking systems 
outside the euro area has continued to improve 
but is still weaker than the pre-crisis period in most 
advanced economies, consistent with generally 
subdued macroeconomic conditions. In the United 
States, the aggregate NPL ratio for the largest banks 
declined to 4½ per cent in December 2012, down 
from a peak of 7 per cent in early 2010 (Graph 1.14). 
The NPL ratio for residential real estate loans remains 
high, however, and rose further over 2012, partly 
as a result of new regulatory guidance requiring 
banks to reclassify loans to individuals that have 
filed for bankruptcy as non-performing (Graph 1.15). 
While conditions in the US housing market remain 
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challenging, indicators such as construction 
activity and house prices have started to pick up. 
There are still a large number of borrowers in the 
United States facing repayment strain that have 
been reluctant to sell because they have been in 
negative equity. The recent pick-up in house prices 
could therefore encourage them to sell their homes, 
potentially tempering the overall recovery in house 
prices. Asset performance in other parts of the 
US banks’ portfolios has continued to improve in 
recent quarters; NPL ratios for the commercial and 
consumer portfolios are now at levels usually seen 
during sustained economic expansions, while the 
ratio for the commercial real estate portfolio has 
also declined sharply from its peak, consistent with 
the partial recovery in commercial property prices 
(Graph 1.16).
While the large banks’ aggregate NPL ratio has 
also been declining in the United Kingdom, it 
remains elevated at around 6½ per cent and the 
authorities there have raised concerns similar to 
those in the euro area about the adequacy of banks’ 
provisioning for problem loans. Around one-third 
of UK banks’ commercial property exposures are 
believed to be subject to forbearance, in that banks 
have restructured or otherwise modified the terms 
of loans to help struggling borrowers cope with 
the repayments and thereby avoiding having to 
classify the loan as non-performing. The low level 
of corporate insolvencies in the United Kingdom, 
despite the run-up in debt during the boom, is 
thought to be linked to forbearance; 8 per cent 
of UK businesses report that they can only meet 
interest payments on their debt and are unable to 
pay down principal. It is also estimated that between 
5 and 8 per cent of UK mortgages have been subject 
to forbearance, such as conversion to interest-only 
terms. Helping viable borrowers recover from 
temporary repayment difficulties can be prudent, 
but if banks are overly optimistic about the potential 
for borrowers to sustainably recover, it could result in 
large increases in their loan losses.
The European authorities have also highlighted 
forbearance of commercial property loans as a 
potential risk to banks’ asset performance in some 
euro area countries. Commercial property prices 
remain depressed in many euro area countries, 
which has resulted in commercial real estate 
exposures generating concern for several euro area 
banks (Graph 1.16). For example, the problems of 
the recently nationalised Dutch bank SNS Reaal 
stemmed mainly from its domestic and Spanish 
commercial property portfolios.
Outside the United States, the United Kingdom 
and the euro area, banks in some other advanced 
economies have been experiencing more 
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Graph 1.17favourable asset performance in recent years, 
amid stronger economic activity and rapid house 
price appreciation (Graph 1.17). Several smaller 
open economies, including Canada, New Zealand, 
Norway, Sweden and Switzerland, have experienced 
faster credit growth and buoyant housing market 
conditions fostered by low interest rates and 
strong competition for mortgages. In some of 
these countries, monetary policy may have been 
constrained by exchange rate regimes and related 
considerations. Because a prolonged period of low 
interest rates can result in a build-up of credit risk 
long before inflation starts to rise, the authorities 
have instead sought to restrain mortgage lending 
through prudential measures, such as higher capital 
requirements and tighter lending standards. The 
authorities in Sweden and Norway, for example, 
have proposed increased capital requirements for 
residential mortgages through higher risk weights 
and capital add-ons, to address their concerns that 
banks’ own models do not fully capture the systemic 
risks from their lending. Similar concerns prompted 
the Swiss authorities to recently activate their 
Basel  III countercyclical capital buffer: Swiss banks 
will be required to hold additional common equity 
Tier  1 capital of 1 per cent of risk-weighted assets 
by September 2013 against their Swiss residential 
property exposures. In Canada, the government has 
tightened the criteria for government-guaranteed 
mortgage insurance in response to concerns 
about rising household indebtedness, since the 
government – rather than lenders – would bear the 
initial losses from any future downturn.
The strong pick-up in residential property prices in 
New Zealand recently, particularly in Auckland and 
Christchurch, has been accompanied by an increase 
in high loan-to-valuation ratio (LVR) lending. The 
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (the bank supervisor) 
has been investigating the possible role for prudential 
tools, such as sectoral capital requirements and 
restrictions on high-LVR mortgages, to constrain 
credit growth and reduce any overheating in 
housing markets. Any deployment of these kinds 
of tools would have implications for the major 
Australian banks as their subsidiaries account for the 
bulk of the New Zealand banking system.
Banking Systems in the asian 
Region
Banking systems in Asia remain solidly profitable. 
Despite the headwinds from the euro area financial 
crisis and the recent slowing in regional economic 
growth, NPL ratios in most banking systems in Asia 
are near cyclical lows (Graph 1.18). A number of 
larger banks in the region, particularly the Japanese 
banks, have been actively seeking to expand within 
Asia, which has helped offset the pullback by some 
euro area banks, particularly in areas such as trade 
and project finance on which Asian growth is quite 
dependent. Aggregate capital ratios across Asian 
banking systems have generally increased over 
2012 and remain relatively high. This has put them 
in a good position to meet the Basel III capital rules 
that most banking supervisors in the region have 
begun to implement from the beginning of this year, 
consistent with the internationally agreed timetable.
Despite solid asset performance overall, a long 
period of strong credit expansion within a relatively 
low interest rate environment has raised a general 
concern about a build-up in credit risk. There has 
been a particular focus recently on loans made 
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to trade-exposed companies with slowing profit 
growth (particularly in Korea, China and Indonesia). 
In Korea, the share of loans in arrears has increased 
over the past year driven by loans to large companies 
and low-income and self-employed households, 
particularly those in older age groups (Graph 1.19). 
Korean authorities have focused their supervisory 
oversight on loans for housing-related construction, 
shipbuilding and shipping, as a housing market 
downturn in the Seoul metropolitan area and soft 
external conditions are expected to weigh on these 
industries in particular. In India, the banks’ NPL ratio 
has also started to rise from a low base. This is largely 
related to loans to ‘priority sectors’, such as agriculture 
and small business, to which domestic banks have 
been required to target 40 per cent of their total 
lending. Further deterioration in export performance 
and weakening property markets could raise NPL 
ratios in a number of countries in the region.
In China, the stock of NPLs on banks’ balance 
sheets has continued to increase steadily since 
its trough in the September quarter 2011 
(Graph 1.20). However, solid growth in lending has 
kept the aggregate NPL ratio on a downward trend 
and saw it reach a new low of just under 1 per cent 
in December 2012. This decrease was driven by 
the five largest commercial banks, which account 
for about half of Chinese banking system assets. 
The aggregate NPL ratio of smaller banks, such as 
joint-stock and rural banks, rose slightly over 2012. 
Concerns remain over the quality of infrastructure-
related loans made to local governments during the 
2009–2010 countercyclical credit surge and banks 
are commonly thought to be forbearing on some of 
these loans, which could result in higher loan losses 
in the future. 
The strong issuance of wealth management 
products (WMPs) in recent years has also garnered 
attention and could present additional risks to the 
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Chinese banking system. These products are lightly 
regulated, higher-yielding alternatives to deposits 
typically offered to high-wealth individuals. Despite 
their short-term nature, the funds raised through 
these off-balance sheet vehicles are often invested 
in longer-term assets to generate higher returns; 
the resulting maturity mismatch exposes WMPs to 
refinancing risk. In addition, while the WMPs disclose 
little information about their credit risks, their 
underlying asset quality is likely to be poorer relative 
to banks’ on-balance sheet exposures. These risks 
were highlighted by the default of a WMP marketed 
by a small bank in late 2012. Further defaults could 
put pressure on sponsoring banks and on the 
Chinese authorities to regulate the sector more 
tightly. There has been some media speculation 
that the Chinese authorities are looking at ways to 
increase transparency about banks’ involvement in 
and risk exposure to WMPs.
Some countries in the Asian region have fixed or 
managed exchange rate regimes and have therefore 
effectively imported the exceptionally low interest 
rates prevailing in the large advanced economies. 
This has contributed to rapid property price increases 
in Hong Kong, as well as strong credit growth 
in both Hong Kong and Singapore (Graph  1.21). 
Regulators in these countries have responded by 
implementing further rounds of macroprudential 
measures in an attempt to restrict lending activity 
and growth in prices. In Hong Kong, regulators have 
sought to reduce speculative demand by increasing 
stamp duty on residential properties sold within 
three years of their purchase and imposing stamp 
duty on non-residents’ purchases. Banks have also 
been instructed to lower their maximum LVRs for 
mortgages, apply a minimum 15 per cent risk weight 
to their mortgage portfolios and undertake stricter 
debt-serviceability testing of mortgage applicants. 
Similarly, the Singaporean authorities have sought 
to reduce investor and foreign demand by capping 
loan terms at 35  years for residential properties, 
decreasing maximum LVRs and increasing stamp 
duty on purchases of properties by non-citizens 
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and on purchases of second properties by citizens. 
Elsewhere, recent rates of credit growth seem to have 
broadly matched the pace of growth in incomes. The 
repeated steps some Asian countries have taken to 
tighten macroprudential policy settings over recent 
years in response to continued credit and property 
market expansion illustrates some of the challenges 
associated with calibrating and targeting these kinds 
of policies.
In China, earlier steps to ease monetary and fiscal 
policy settings have contributed to a recovery 
in property prices since the middle of last year. 
This pick-up in property prices has more recently 
led the Chinese authorities to implement a fresh 
round of measures aimed at curbing speculative 
demand. Measures implemented include the stricter 
enforcement of capital gains tax on property sales and 
increased minimum down payments and mortgage 
rates for second-home purchases in cities where 
property price growth has been judged as being 
excessive. Given conservative mortgage lending 
standards and low household indebtedness in China, 
these measures do not appear to be motivated 
by concern about excessive growth in household 
credit. Rather, earlier statements by the Chinese 
authorities suggest that the main objective has been 
to improve housing affordability and to reduce the 
Chinese economy’s reliance on the property sector. 
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Banks have also been instructed to restrict lending 
to the property development sector in recent years, 
other than to developers of affordable housing. 
These credit restrictions have reinforced the effect 
of earlier property market measures in dampening 
activity in some segments of the property market, 
but they have also encouraged developers to seek 
alternative sources of funding. For example, bond 
issuance by Chinese property developers has surged 
in recent years, particularly by issuers with low or 
no credit ratings. There has been strong demand 
for such bonds, allowing them to be issued at quite 
low yields, indicating high risk appetite and perhaps 
some complacency by investors about the business 
models of such firms.  R
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2. The australian Financial System
The Australian banking system remains in a relatively 
strong position. Wholesale funding cost pressures 
have diminished in recent months as global market 
sentiment has improved. The banks have continued 
to strengthen their capital, funding and liquidity 
positions, thereby improving their resilience to 
future shocks or periods of market turbulence. As a 
result of the strengthening of their capital positions 
over recent years, the banks are well placed to meet 
the Basel III minimum capital requirements that the 
Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
began phasing in from the start of this year.
Banks’ asset performance has continued to improve 
gradually over recent quarters, even though 
challenging conditions in parts of the business 
sector have been contributing to a relatively high 
inflow of newly impaired loans. While overall 
asset performance remains weaker than in the 
years leading up to the global financial crisis, the 
tightening in banks’ lending standards since this 
time has improved the underlying resilience of their 
loan books to adverse macroeconomic conditions.
Growth in banks’ profits has slowed in recent 
reporting periods, although aggregate profitability 
has been strong and is expected to remain so in the 
period ahead. The slow credit growth environment 
is likely to encourage banks to implement new 
strategies to underpin their profit growth over the 
medium term. To some extent, signs of this are 
already evident in the greater focus banks have 
recently given to cost control and in the Asian 
expansion strategies that some have been pursuing 
to varying degrees. Of themselves, these strategies 
need not be detrimental to financial stability – 
indeed some income diversification among the 
banks may be beneficial in that respect. However, 
indiscriminate cost cutting, laxer lending standards 
or aggressive expansion into unfamiliar markets 
or products would heighten risks to the banks 
themselves and potentially also to financial stability.
The general insurance industry remains well 
capitalised and its profitability has strengthened in 
recent reporting periods, partly because of a more 
benign catastrophe claims experience. The natural 
disasters in early 2013 are expected to have only a 
minor financial impact on insurers.
Domestic asset Performance
The business models of most Australian banks 
are heavily focused on lending, particularly in the 
domestic market. Credit risk is therefore one of the 
main sources of risk facing the banking system and 
a key focus of financial stability analysis. The asset 
performance of the Australian banks deteriorated 
during the 2008–2009 crisis period and associated 
economic slowdown, but has been gradually 
recovering over the past few years.
In the banks’ domestic portfolio, the ratio of 
non-performing loans to total loans was 1.5 per cent 
at December 2012, down from a peak of 1.9  per 
cent in 2010 (Graph 2.1). The improvement since 
the peak has been driven by a fall in the share of 
loans classified as impaired (not well secured and 
where repayment is doubtful), which also accounted 
for most of the earlier increase. The share of loans 
classified as past due (in arrears but well secured) 
has declined modestly since its peak in 2011, and is 
currently about half the impaired assets ratio.
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The decline in the banks’ impaired assets ratio over 
the past few years has been sluggish for a number 
of reasons. These include that banks have generally 
been dealing with their impaired business loans at 
a measured pace in order to maximise recoveries 
as economic and market conditions improve. 
Accordingly, loan write-offs have been fairly gradual, 
especially compared with the quick pace that 
followed the early 1990s recession (when banks’ asset 
quality was also much weaker than today). Another 
factor is that the inflow of newly impaired loans 
has been at a relatively high level over recent years 
(Graph 2.2). While inflows of newly impaired assets 
were at unusually low levels during the 2004–2007 
period, associated with the buoyant asset valuations 
and credit growth prevailing at that time, average 
inflows over the past few years have also been above 
those recorded prior to 2004.
Banks’ commercial property exposures have been 
a key driver of the above-average flow of new 
impairments over the past few years. Consistent with 
this, they continue to account for a sizeable share of 
the impaired assets in banks’ domestic business loan 
portfolios (Graph 2.3). Around 3½ per cent of banks’ 
domestic commercial property exposures were 
classified as impaired in December 2012, down from 
a peak of about 6 per cent in mid 2010. The decline 
in this ratio reflected improved conditions in parts 
of the commercial property market, but also the 
disposal of troubled exposures by banks, including 
some European-owned banks that have been 
pulling back from the Australian market.
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Soft business conditions and profitability in some 
other industries, as discussed in the ‘Business 
and Household Balance Sheets’ chapter, have 
also contributed to the elevated rate of new loan 
impairments over recent years, although the 
performance of banks’ domestic non-property 
business exposures improved modestly over the 
second half of 2012. Overall, the share of banks’ 
domestic business loans that is impaired has drifted 
lower, to 2.2 per cent, about 90 basis points below 
its 2010 peak.
In comparison with banks’ business loans, the 
deterioration in the performance of their housing 
loans following the 2008–2009 crisis period was fairly 
mild. The non-performing share of banks’ domestic 
housing loans peaked at 0.9 per cent in mid 2011, and 
has since declined to 0.7 per cent at December 2012. 
The recent improvement can be partly explained by 
lower interest rates and a tightening in mortgage 
lending standards after 2008; loans originated 
after this time have performed better than those 
originated in the preceding few years. Some banks 
have also strengthened their collections processes 
in recent years, reducing the time that loans stay in 
arrears before they are resolved.
The improvement in banks’ domestic asset 
performance over recent quarters has been 
broad based across the industry (Graph 2.4). 
Some European-owned banks and smaller 
Australian-owned banks have recently recorded 
significant declines in their non-performing business 
loan ratios, partly due to sales of troubled exposures. 
Even so, these banks’ asset performance remains 
weaker than that of the major Australian banks. 
The non-performing share of credit unions and 
building societies’ (CUBS) assets rose slightly over 
the six months to December 2012, but at 0.5  per 
cent it remains well below the ratio for banks. While 
the CUBS’ better overall asset performance is partly 
explained by their higher share of housing loans, 
the non-performing share of their housing loans is 
also below that of the banks; former CUBS that have 
recently converted to mutual banks have similarly 
low non-performing asset ratios.
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According to industry liaison, the continued run-off 
of troubled exposures that were originated some 
years ago should exert further downward pressure 
on banks’ non-performing loans. Specific provisions 
and available security currently cover over 95 per 
cent of the stock of domestic impaired assets, so (all 
else equal) these exposures are unlikely to generate 
further losses for banks unless the underlying asset 
valuations prove to be unrealistic. In the immediate 
period ahead, the performance of banks’ loans is 
likely to continue to benefit from below-average 
interest rates. There is always a risk, though, that 
economic and financial conditions could deteriorate 
significantly, which would worsen banks’ asset 
performance. The banks should be less affected 
by such a scenario than they were in 2008–2009 
because the tightening in lending standards has 
improved the underlying quality of their loan books. 
Consistent with this, average risk weights on most 
banks’ mortgage and business loan portfolios have 
declined over the past couple of years.
Credit Conditions and Lending 
Standards
Growth in banks’ domestic loan books remained 
relatively modest over the past six months 
(Graph 2. 5). Household credit grew at an annualised 
rate of about 4 per cent over the six months to 
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January 2013, as many households have preferred to 
pay down existing debt rather than take on new debt 
(see the ‘Business and Household Balance Sheets’ 
chapter). Businesses’ demand for intermediated 
debt has also been subdued, with business credit 
remaining broadly unchanged over the past six 
months. In addition to deleveraging by some firms, 
another factor weighing on business credit recently 
is that some large businesses have raised a greater 
share of their debt from bond markets, given 
relatively favourable pricing. While this has reduced 
banks’ lending opportunities, some banks have been 
looking to shift to fee-paying advisory roles with 
their corporate clients instead.
Slow credit growth can pressure banks to compete 
harder to maintain their overall revenue growth. 
From a risk management perspective, it is important 
that banks do not respond by imprudently loosening 
their lending standards. The available evidence 
suggests this is not occurring at this stage. According 
to industry liaison, business loan conditions were 
broadly unchanged over recent quarters. The 
exception is the ‘wholesale’ market (i.e. large-value 
loans), where strong competition amid weak 
borrower demand has compressed loan margins 
and, in some instances, eased loan covenants. Some 
Asian-owned banks seeking to expand their business 
in Australia are reportedly competing aggressively 
for syndicated loans, increasing their share of this 
market noticeably over the past year (Table 2.1). At 
the same time, a number of European-owned banks 
have continued to pull back from business lending 
in Australia, especially syndicated and commercial 
property lending. This is related to their earlier loan 
quality problems and difficulties in their home 
jurisdictions.
In the residential mortgage market, competition 
for new borrowers has seen some lenders increase 
interest rate discounts modestly and offer to 
reimburse refinancing costs or waive application 
fees. Non-price loan standards, however, appear 
to have been broadly unchanged over the past six 
months. As interest rates have fallen below average, 
a number of banks have recently increased the size 
of the interest rate buffers they add to their lending 
rate when assessing borrowers’ loan-servicing 
capacity. This is a prudent approach to ensuring that 
Table 2.1: Banks’ Business Lending Activity(a)
By ownership, as at December, per cent
                        Share of business loans(b)              Share of syndicated loans(c)
2007 2011 2012 2007 2011 2012
Australian 80 87 87 40 44 42
Asian 3 5 5 13 18 23
European 14 7 6 36 28 24
Other 2 2 2 11 10 11
(a) Shares might not sum to 100 per cent due to rounding
(b)  Bank loans in Australia; non-seasonally and non-break adjusted; excludes securitisations; the purchase of Bankwest by CBA in 2008 
contributed to a decline for European banks
(c)  RBA estimates; includes offshore banks; mostly loans to non-financial corporations
Sources: APRA; RBA; Thomson Reuters
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new borrowers are better able to cope with higher 
mortgage repayments in a future period of higher 
interest rates.
Foreign Exposures
While the Australian-owned banks are still 
predominantly domestically focused, they also have 
foreign exposures stemming from their overseas 
operations, as well as the direct cross-border 
activities of their Australian operations. These foreign 
activities provide income diversification and other 
benefits to banks, but they also expose them to 
various risks and could be a source of strain to the 
parent bank if conditions deteriorate offshore.
Australian-owned banks’ aggregate foreign claims 
(i.e. exposures) represent a bit over one-fifth of their 
global consolidated assets, which is a smaller share 
than for many other large banking systems. These 
claims are geographically concentrated, with the 
bulk of them on New Zealand, where the major banks 
each have large local operations, and the United 
Kingdom, where NAB also has a large operation 
(Table  2.2). Claims on the Asian region are smaller, 
but have grown strongly over recent years. Unlike for 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom, a significant 
share of the Australian-owned banks’ claims on Asia 
are cross-border rather than via local operations. This 
is because their motivation for expanding into Asia 
has partly been to support their domestic clients’ 
activities in the region and to expand their provision 
of trade finance there (see ‘Box A: Australian Bank 
Activity in Asia’).
The performance of Australian-owned banks’ 
overseas loans has been somewhat weaker than 
that of their domestic loans in recent years. Banks’ 
overseas non-performing loans were steady over 
the year to December 2012, although there was 
a significant divergence in performance across 
their main overseas markets (Graph 2.6). Loan 
performance in New Zealand has strengthened as 
economic conditions there have improved, whereas 
in the United Kingdom loan performance has been 
persistently weaker and worsened further over the 
second half of 2012. This mostly reflects the ongoing 
difficult economic and property market conditions in 
the northern part of the United Kingdom where most 
of NAB’s UK exposures are located. By comparison, 
Australian-owned banks’ loan performance in 
the Asian region has been better, in part because 
economic conditions in Asia have been reasonably 
strong, and because a significant portion of their 
exposures there have a lower credit-risk profile.
As discussed in ‘The Global Financial Environment’ 
chapter, there has recently been rapid growth in 
residential property prices in a couple of the largest 
cities in New Zealand. This has been associated with 
strong competition for new borrowers, particularly 
in the higher loan-to-valuation ratio segment of the 
mortgage market. While housing loan portfolios of 
the Australian banks’ subsidiaries in New Zealand are 
Table 2.2: Australian-owned Banks’ Foreign Claims
Consolidated global operations, immediate borrower basis, per cent
Share of consolidated assets Share of foreign claims(a)
Dec 2007 Dec 2012 Dec 2012
New Zealand 10.2 8.2 37
United Kingdom 6.6 4.8 22
Asian region 1.2 3.6 16
United States 2.4 3.1 14
Other countries 2.9 2.6 12
Total 23.3 22.2 100
(a) Shares do not sum to 100 per cent due to rounding
Sources: APRA; RBA
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currently performing well, a significant relaxation of 
their lending standards in pursuit of market share 
could pose problems once interest rates in New 
Zealand eventually rise, or in the event of a downturn 
in economic and property market conditions there.
As discussed in the previous Review, the 
Australian-owned banks have limited direct 
exposures to the most troubled euro area countries. 
They are indirectly exposed to these countries via 
their claims on euro area banks that have substantial 
direct exposures to the weaker countries, but these 
claims amount to less than 1 per cent of their 
consolidated assets.
Funding and Liquidity
International financial and economic conditions 
can also pose challenges for the liability side of 
Australian banks’ balance sheets, as demonstrated 
by the periodic bouts of turbulence in global 
capital markets over recent years and the wholesale 
funding pressures they created for Australian banks. 
Wholesale funding conditions have improved for 
Australian banks since around the middle of 2012 
as global market sentiment has recovered (see ‘The 
Global Financial Environment’ chapter). Spreads 
between banks’ senior unsecured bonds and 
Commonwealth Government securities (CGS) have 
declined by more than 100 basis points over this 
period, and are now around their lowest levels since 
the start of the global financial crisis (Graph 2.7). 
Covered bond spreads have also narrowed sharply 
since the banks started issuing these types of debt 
securities in November 2011.
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The Australian banks issued around $40  billion of 
bonds in the past six months. Over three-quarters 
of this was in unsecured form, a higher share than 
in the preceding few quarters when banks issued 
larger amounts of covered bonds (Graph 2.8). Given 
that covered bond markets have tended to be more 
resilient during times of financial market stress, the 
major banks appear to be spreading out their covered 
bond issues in a desire to keep some issuance 
capacity in reserve in case conditions deteriorate 
again; the banks have currently issued between 
20 and 40  per cent of their regulatory capacity for 
covered bonds. Banks have also taken advantage 
of the more favourable funding climate by buying 
back a significant amount of their outstanding 
government-guaranteed debt, as the cost of new 
unsecured issuance has become cheaper once the 
guarantee fee is factored in.1
1  For more information, see RBA (2013), ‘Box D: Buybacks of Government 
Guaranteed Securities’, Statement on Monetary Policy, February, pp 54–55.
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Conditions in the residential mortgage-backed 
securities (RMBS) market have also improved over 
the past six months, with the tightening of spreads 
for other debt securities helping to entice investors 
back into the market. Australian financial institutions 
have issued over $10 billion in RMBS since October 
2012; a number of these transactions were priced 
at spreads around 60 basis points narrower than in 
early 2012. As a result of strong demand from private 
sector investors, the Australian Office of Financial 
Management has not invested in any deals over the 
past six months. Further momentum in securitisation 
markets will be relatively beneficial for smaller banks’ 
funding, given that they have less ready access to 
bond markets than the major banks.
Changes in the composition of the Australian banks’ 
funding over the past few years have left them in a 
better position to cope with disruptions to funding 
markets. The share of banks’ funding from domestic 
deposits has increased from about 40 per cent in 
2008 to 55 per cent currently; this shift was largely at 
the expense of short-term wholesale funding, which 
is typically perceived by markets to be a less stable 
source of funding (Graph 2.9). The major banks’ 
current funding strategies generally involve rolling 
over existing term wholesale funding (with zero net 
issuance) and funding new loans with new deposits 
on a dollar-for-dollar basis. Banks have been able 
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to achieve this for a couple of years now, with net 
deposit flows generally exceeding their net credit 
flows, especially over recent months (Graph 2.10). 
Currently, banks’ deposits are growing at an annual 
rate of around 9 per cent, well above credit growth 
of 4 per cent.
The corollary of the banks’ desire to limit their use of 
wholesale funding is ongoing strong competition 
for deposits, which has resulted in average spreads 
on retail deposits remaining around historical highs 
over the past six months (Graph 2.11). While average 
spreads on term deposits have declined recently, 
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assets), up from less than $25 billion prior to the 
global financial crisis (1 per cent of Australian dollar 
domestic assets) (Graph 2.12). However, given the 
low amount of government debt in Australia, APRA 
has adopted elements of the Basel rules that allow 
banks to count a committed liquidity facility (CLF) 
provided by the central bank as part of their Basel III 
liquidity requirements. APRA is in the process of 
finalising a framework that will ensure banks take all 
reasonable steps to minimise the CLF’s contribution 
to their liquidity requirements – for example, by 
lengthening their funding maturities. The banks will 
be charged an access fee for the CLF, whether or not 
it is drawn, and it will be secured against assets that 
are eligible for the Reserve Bank’s normal market 
operations. Self-securitised RMBS will also be able to 
form part of the collateral for the CLF. Banks’ holdings 
of self-securitised RMBS have increased markedly in 
recent years, and now total about $200 billion (8 per 
cent of their Australian dollar domestic assets).
there has been a marked shift in competition towards 
some at-call deposit products, such as ‘bonus saver 
accounts’.2 The major banks generally do not expect 
overall competition in the retail deposit market 
to ease materially, at least in the near term, but 
they are seeking to become more targeted in their 
deposit strategies ahead of the implementation of 
the Basel  III liquidity standard, such as by adjusting 
deposit pricing and introducing new products. 
Indeed, a number of banks have recently begun 
offering deposit products that require a notice of 
withdrawal of at least 31 days in advance, as these 
will receive a more favourable liquidity treatment 
under the standard.
Banks have also improved their ability to deal with 
funding stress by increasing their holdings of liquid 
assets in recent years. These changes are partly a 
response to the Basel III liquidity standard that will 
require banks to hold more and higher-quality liquid 
assets. For Australian dollar-denominated liquid 
assets, CGS and state government debt will account 
for the bulk of banks’ high-quality liquid assets 
under the standard. Australian banks currently hold 
around $130 billion of these securities (equivalent to 
about 5 per cent of their Australian dollar domestic 
2  For further details, see Robertson B and A Rush (2013), ‘Developments in 
Banks’ Funding Costs and Lending Rates’, RBA Bulletin, March, pp 63–70.
Capital and Profits
The Australian banks have continued to strengthen 
their capital positions over recent quarters. Their 
aggregate Tier 1 capital ratio (on a Basel II basis) rose 
further over the second half of 2012, to 10.8 per cent 
of risk-weighted assets, up from about 8 per cent 
in late 2008 (Graph 2.13). Most of the increase in 
Tier 1 capital over recent years has been through 
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earnings retention, given robust profitability over the 
period, as well as dividend reinvestment programs. 
CUBS have maintained their higher capital ratios, 
consistent with their less diversified business models 
and different corporate structures; their aggregate 
Tier 1 capital ratio was 15.8 per cent at the end of 
2012.
The greater market and regulatory focus on higher-
quality Tier 1 capital and the maturity of some Tier 2 
capital instruments ineligible under Basel III had seen 
the banks’ aggregate Tier 2 capital ratio decline over 
the past couple of years, to around 1.3 per cent of 
risk-weighted assets in December 2012. However, 
this ratio stabilised over the second half of 2012 due 
to an increase in Tier 2 hybrid issuance. Since APRA 
released guidance in May 2012 on what would qualify 
as non-common equity capital under its Basel III 
capital standards, banks have issued about $7 billion 
of Tier 1 and Tier 2 eligible hybrids, equivalent to 
0.5 per cent of their risk-weighted assets (Graph 2.14). 
There has been strong retail participation in these 
issues, with their relatively high yields in the current 
low-yield environment attracting investor demand. 
Hybrids are structured products and some are 
designed to absorb losses before a bank’s common 
equity has been exhausted; the Australian Securities 
and Investments Commission has issued warnings 
to retail investors about the risks associated with 
holding these instruments and has been reviewing 
product disclosure statements to ensure the risks 
are adequately communicated to investors. Overall, 
the banks’ total capital ratio rose by 0.3 percentage 
points over the second half of 2012, to 12.1 per cent 
of risk-weighted assets.
The significant increase in Tier 1 capital over recent 
years has increased banks’ resilience to adverse 
shocks; recent APRA and International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) stress tests of the largest banks confirmed 
that their Tier 1 capital positions (on a Basel II basis) 
would be sufficient to continue meeting their 
minimum requirements even in a severe recession 
that significantly weakened their asset performance.3 
The strengthening of the capital position over recent 
years has also left the Australian banking system 
well placed to meet the minimum Basel  III capital 
requirements being phased in from the start of this 
year. Large banks’ public disclosures indicate that 
their common equity Tier 1 capital ratios on a Basel III 
basis are currently around 7½ per cent or greater, 
above the 4½ per cent Basel III minimum that is 
now required in Australia (Graph 2.15). These ratios 
also exceed the 7 per cent minimum (including the 
3  For information on APRA’s stress-test scenario, methodology and 
results, see Laker J (2012), ‘The Australian Banking System Under 
Stress – Again?’, speech to the AB+F Randstad Leaders Lecture 2012, 
Brisbane, 8 November. Discussion of the IMF stress tests can be found 
in International Monetary Fund (2012), ‘Australia: Financial Stability 
Assessment’, IMF Country Report No 12/308, November.
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2½  per  cent capital conservation buffer) that the 
banks are required to meet by 2016. The banks are 
likely to need to increase their capital ratios further 
than this, though, in order to provide adequate 
buffers above minimum regulatory requirements, 
including for any Pillar 2 or other capital surcharges 
that APRA may impose due to the risk profile or 
systemic importance of the banks.4 Banks should 
be able to achieve this mainly through earnings 
retention if current profitability continues in the 
future.
As noted above, the improvement in the Australian 
banks’ capital positions over recent years has been 
underpinned by robust profitability; annual return 
on equity of the four major banks averaged around 
15  per cent over 2010–2012. Aggregate profit of 
these banks was $11 billion in their latest half-yearly 
results, broadly unchanged from the previous half 
year, and a little below the peak in 2011 (Graph 2.16). 
At 5 per cent, income growth over the year was at 
a similar pace to the previous two years, but higher 
bad and doubtful debt charges weighed on profits. 
The performance of NAB’s UK loans and, to a lesser 
4 For further discussion on banks’ capital requirements, see Laker J 
(2013), ‘Financial Regulation and Financial Sector Evolution: Looking 
Ahead’, speech to the Australian Centre for Financial Studies/Finsia 
Leadership Luncheon Series, Melbourne, 22 March.
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extent, each of the major banks’ domestic business 
loans drove the increase in the bad debt charge. 
To help offset the effect of slow credit growth on 
their profitability, the banks have been focused 
on fee-generating and cross-selling opportunities 
that are less dependent on their balance sheet, as 
well as improving productivity and reducing costs. 
Cost-related initiatives announced by the banks 
include restructuring operations, reducing staff 
in some areas, and outsourcing certain support 
functions or moving them to lower-cost locations 
offshore. It is important that banks ensure that these 
types of cost-cutting initiatives do not compromise 
their risk management capabilities and controls.
Looking forward, equity analysts are currently 
expecting the major banks’ profits to rise strongly 
during the current financial year. With costs expected 
to continue growing at a slower pace than before the 
financial crisis and bad and doubtful debt charges 
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expected to level out, analysts are forecasting 
aggregate annual return on equity to rise to about 
15 per cent in the major banks’ 2013 financial year 
(Graph 2.17).
The three regional banks (Suncorp, Bank of 
Queensland and Bendigo and Adelaide Bank) 
recorded an aggregate profit of around $270 million 
in their latest half-yearly results, a recovery from 
the $30 million loss in the previous half year. This 
turnaround was driven by an improvement in asset 
performance which allowed some of these banks 
to reduce their bad and doubtful debt charges. 
Asset performance at the regional banks has been 
poorer than for the major Australian banks, partly 
because some of them have greater concentrations 
in Queensland where property market conditions 
have been weaker. Equity analysts are expecting 
the regional banks’ profits to increase again in the 
coming year, supported by further declines in bad 
and doubtful debt charges.
Equity market investors seem to be viewing the 
Australian-owned banks’ financial position and 
earnings prospects favourably, as banks’ share 
prices have risen by about 25 per cent over the 
past six months (Graph 2.18). The banks’ relatively 
high dividend yields appear to have been attractive 
to many investors in the current low interest rate 
environment.
Foreign-owned banks’ profits were mixed in their 
latest half-yearly results. Foreign branches posted 
an aggregate loss for the half-year, largely owing to 
an increase in charges for bad and doubtful debts, 
whereas foreign subsidiaries reported lower charges 
for bad and doubtful debts and higher profits. Profits 
of the foreign branches have been volatile over 
recent years because of losses in their corporate loan 
portfolios and turbulence in capital markets; foreign 
subsidiaries’ profits have been far more stable given 
their focus on retail banking.
Registered Financial Corporations
Since the beginning of the global financial crisis, 
there has been increased interest internationally in 
assessing the risks posed by the so-called shadow 
banking system, which can be broadly defined as 
credit intermediation involving entities and activities 
outside the prudentially regulated banking system. 
The Reserve Bank monitors developments in this 
sector in Australia and provides regular updates 
to the Council of Financial Regulators. Registered 
Financial Corporations (RFCs) (comprising money 
market corporations and finance companies) are the 
financial institutions most readily considered shadow 
banking entities in Australia: they are not prudentially 
regulated by APRA, but they intermediate between 
lenders and borrowers like banks, and some of them 
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engage in investment bank-like activities. There are 
currently over 300 RFCs, but, in aggregate, their share 
of total domestic financial system assets is small 
and has been declining over time (Graph 2.19). The 
significant reduction in this share over recent years 
can partly be attributed to the more difficult funding 
conditions RFCs have faced since the 2008–2009 
crisis period.
credit and funding links to the regulated banking 
system. For example, RFCs’ overall borrowing from, 
and lending to, banks are each equivalent to less 
than 1 per cent of banking system assets.
General Insurance
The general insurance industry remains well 
capitalised at 1.8 times the minimum regulatory 
capital requirement; the industry’s capital position 
rose modestly over the year to December 2012. 
APRA introduced revised, more risk-sensitive, capital 
standards for the general insurance industry at the 
start of 2013, which are also better aligned with 
the capital standards for other APRA-regulated 
industries. The first formal reporting on the level of 
general insurers’ capital under the new standards will 
be for the March quarter 2013.
The profitability of general insurers has been strong: 
annualised return on equity for the industry exceeded 
20 per cent in the second half of 2012, up from about 
10 per cent in 2011 (Graph 2.20). Strong growth in 
underwriting profits was driven by rising premium 
rates for ‘short-tail’ classes of business, in particular 
home and contents and commercial property 
insurance (Graph 2.21). Insurers also benefited from 
a more favourable catastrophe claims experience 
in 2012 compared with the previous two years. 
Although claims are still being assessed, indications 
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Recently there has been a greater focus on the 
activities and financial position of finance companies 
that issue unlisted retail debentures. This follows the 
collapse of a Victorian retail debenture issuer and 
property lender Banksia Securities Limited (BSL) 
in late 2012. BSL was small in size, being only the 
28th largest finance company with reported assets 
of about $690  million. Its failure (and other similar 
failures of smaller finance companies in recent 
years) has had no adverse effect on financial system 
stability, although it has raised investor protection 
concerns given that many of its investors reportedly 
had low risk appetites that seem inconsistent with 
BSL’s relatively risky property-related loan portfolio 
and its thin capital position (see ‘Developments 
in the Financial System Architecture’ chapter for 
more discussion on the regulatory response to 
this development). More broadly, the RFC sector 
in Australia poses limited risks to financial stability 
because of its small size, heterogeneity and minimal 
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are that the January 2013 floods and bushfires in 
parts of Australia will not be severe claims events. 
The Insurance Council of Australia’s current estimate 
of claims from these disasters is about $1 billion 
(before reinsurance), well below the $2.4 billion 
claims arising from the 2011 Queensland floods.
Also boosting insurers’ income recently were 
valuation gains as yields on their holdings of highly 
rated debt securities declined. However, a prolonged 
period of low investment yields could present 
challenges for insurers’ profitability. Lower investment 
returns mean insurers would need to generate more 
premium revenue to cover future claim payments, 
particularly for ‘long-tail’ insurance products such 
as liability insurance. Competitive pressures and 
statutory limits appear to be constraining insurers’ 
ability to increase premium rates for most long-tail 
business lines, although as noted above, premium 
rates have been rising strongly for some short-tail 
classes of business. It would be undesirable if 
insurers responded to premium constraints by 
shifting the composition of their portfolios towards 
riskier, higher-yielding assets, although there does 
not appear to have been a material change in the 
overall risk profile of investment portfolios at this 
point. Another concern would be if the insurance 
industry sought to support short-term profitability 
through inappropriate releases from reserves; in this 
regard, APRA has been reviewing reserve practices 
and adequacy within the industry. No material 
concerns regarding industry reserving practices 
have been identified, but it is an area that APRA is 
continuing to monitor.
Lenders’ mortgage insurers (LMIs) offer protection to 
banks and other lenders against losses on defaulted 
residential mortgages, in return for an insurance 
premium that is usually paid by the borrower. 
Mortgages originated with loan-to-valuation ratios 
of 80  per cent or greater are typically fully insured 
in Australia, which is less common internationally. 
By insuring banks against losses on their higher-risk 
mortgages, the LMI industry can support financial 
stability, but the concentration of LMIs’ business in 
correlated risks necessitates strong capitalisation 
and prudential supervision. The industry is also quite 
concentrated, with two firms accounting for about 
three-quarters of industry assets. The LMI industry 
currently holds about 1½  times the minimum 
capital requirement which is, in turn, designed to 
absorb losses from a very severe housing market 
downturn. While the LMIs are generally highly rated 
by the major rating agencies, Moody’s recently 
reviewed its global methodology for rating LMIs, 
which resulted in downgrades in the credit ratings 
of the two largest LMIs in Australia to low single-A 
ranges. This reflected Moody’s assessment that the 
LMIs’ capital buffers would be tested in the event of 
a severe economic and property market downturn 
in Australia (akin to that experienced in the United 
States over 2007–2011). The downgrades have 
contributed to some downgrades of ratings on 
RMBS tranches, given the credit enhancement LMIs 
provide to these securities, but have not directly 
affected the LMIs’ operations.
The LMI industry’s profitability was relatively subdued 
in 2012. Consistent with the pattern of mortgage 
arrears for banks, insured mortgages originated in 
the past few years are performing relatively well, 
but the LMIs have experienced elevated claims 
from: loans written in 2007 and 2008; loans to the 
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Table 2.3: Assets of Domestic Funds Management Institutions
As at December 2012
           Six-month-ended
          annualised change
Level
$ billion
Share of total
Per cent
Jun 12
Per cent
Dec 12
Per cent
Superannuation funds 1 457 73 12.7 17.0
Life insurers(a) 246 12 5.9 9.3
Public unit trusts 264 13 –3.2 2.7
Other managed funds(b) 42 2 6.5 1.1
Total (unconsolidated) 2 010 100 9.3 13.6
of which:
Cross investments 406 – 6.6 11.5
Total (consolidated) 1 604 – 10.0 14.2
(a) Includes superannuation assets held in statutory funds of life insurers
(b) Cash management trusts, common funds and friendly societies
Source: ABS
self-employed; and loans for properties in coastal 
Queensland. Reflecting this, LMIs’ loss ratio – claims 
expense as a share of premium revenue – was a bit 
above its long-run average in 2012.
managed Funds
Over the past two decades, banking groups in 
Australia have acquired a number of life insurers and 
other funds management businesses, such as those 
that manage superannuation funds. A number of 
large life insurers and retail superannuation funds 
are now owned by or related to banking groups. The 
wealth management operations of the major banks 
currently generate about 7–10  per cent of their 
group profits, and have been a fairly stable source 
of earnings.
The strong growth in the managed funds sector in 
Australia over recent decades has been one of the 
motivations for the banks to diversify into wealth 
management operations. The managed funds sector 
currently has about $1.6  trillion in funds under 
management on a consolidated basis, equivalent to 
almost 110 per cent of GDP, up from about 55 per 
cent of GDP two decades ago (Table  2.3). Over 
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the six months to December 2012, assets under 
management grew by 14  per cent in annualised 
terms, driven by higher equity prices. Superannuation 
funds – which account for nearly three-quarters of 
the managed funds sector – experienced growth of 
17 per cent in annualised terms, the strongest rate 
of growth since the equity market recovery in 2009 
(Graph 2.22).
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Self-managed superannuation funds (SMSFs) have 
become a significant part of the superannuation 
industry, with around $470  billion of assets under 
management as at December 2012. This represents 
close to one-third of all superannuation assets, a 
share that has increased by more than 10 percentage 
points over the past decade (Graph 2.23). Part of the 
appeal of SMSFs is that they allow people to control 
their own superannuation investments, although 
SMSFs are not subject to prudential regulation by 
APRA and therefore do not benefit from the same 
protections as APRA-regulated superannuation 
funds. While borrowing by superannuation funds is 
generally prohibited, SMSFs are permitted limited 
use of gearing through non-recourse borrowing. 
APRA requires banks to take into account the 
different (and potentially higher) risks posed by 
SMSF loans when calculating their regulatory capital 
requirements.
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their funds invested in bank equity and liabilities, 
and the superannuation operations of banks make a 
notable contribution to bank profits.
Life insurers’ funds under management rose by about 
9 per cent in annualised terms over the second half 
of 2012, driven by strong investment returns from 
equities and debt securities. Life insurers reported 
aggregate profits of $1.4  billion in the six months 
to December, around two-thirds of which was 
derived from their superannuation business and the 
remainder from their ordinary life insurance business 
(Graph 2.24). Profits from their superannuation 
business were a little above average due to strong 
investment returns, while profits from their ordinary 
life insurance business were close to their recent 
average level.
The profitability of the life insurance sector has 
contributed to its strong capital position over recent 
years, with the industry holding capital equivalent 
to 1½  times its capital adequacy requirement as at 
December 2012. Like general insurers, life insurers are 
also subject to the revised insurance capital standards 
that APRA introduced this year; the first data 
indicating the effect of these standards on life insurers’ 
capital will also be for the March quarter 2013.
Loans to the superannuation sector have grown 
strongly in percentage terms over the past several 
years, but they still account for well under 1 per cent 
of banks’ loan portfolios. Given the limited borrowing 
from the banking sector at this point, these activities 
pose limited risks to banks’ asset performance. 
However, there are other important links between 
the banking and superannuation sectors: 
superannuation funds have around one-quarter of 
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relative to the pre-crisis period, helping to reduce 
potential operational and liquidity risks that could 
emerge late in the settlement day.
Low-value payments, such as direct entry, consumer 
electronic (card-based) payments and cheque 
transactions, are multilaterally netted and settled 
in RITS in a single batch at 9 am the following day, 
rather than on a real-time gross settlement basis. In 
2010, the Reserve Bank introduced a new system, 
the Low Value Settlement Service (LVSS), to increase 
the efficiency of low-value payments settlement. All 
low-value payment types were successfully migrated 
to the LVSS by October 2012. The Reserve Bank is 
working with the industry to implement, for direct 
entry payments, multilateral settlement at regular 
intervals on the same day by the end of 2013. This 
will reduce the credit exposure that can arise when 
payments are posted to customer accounts ahead of 
interbank settlement.
To ensure the safety and stability of the payments 
system, the Reserve Bank periodically conducts 
self-assessments of RITS against relevant 
international principles, which are reviewed by the 
Payments System Board. The next such review is 
planned to take place in late 2013.
The two Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) central 
counterparties, ASX Clear and ASX Clear (Futures), 
provide centralised management of counterparty 
risk in the ASX and ASX 24 equities and derivatives 
markets. From 29 March 2013, the Reserve Bank’s 
revised Financial Stability Standards will apply 
to the two ASX central counterparties (see the 
‘Developments in the Financial System Architecture’ 
chapter). One important aim of the new standards 
is to ensure that central counterparties control the 
risks they pose to the Australian financial system in 
accordance with international best practice. This 
includes more granular requirements for the calling 
of margin from participants and the sufficiency of 
pooled risk resources held by central counterparties 
(also known as ‘default funds’).5
5  For details of the enhanced requirements of the new Financial Stability 
Standards, see Reserve Bank of Australia (2012), New Financial Stability 
Standards: Final Standards and Regulation Impact Statement, December. 
Financial market Infrastructure
Financial market infrastructures (FMIs), such as 
payment, clearing and settlement systems, are the 
systems that facilitate most financial transactions 
and trading activity in the economy. Given the critical 
services they provide to participants in the financial 
system, the smooth operation of FMIs is crucial for 
financial stability.
The Reserve Bank operates Australia’s high-value 
payments settlement system, the Reserve Bank 
Information and Transfer System (RITS), through 
which most interbank payments are settled. RITS 
continued to function smoothly during the past six 
months, settling around 5 million payments worth 
$19 trillion. The average daily volume of transactions 
settled in RITS was steady over the six months to 
March 2013 (Graph 2.25). In contrast, the average 
daily value of transactions declined by 4 per cent to 
$156 billion, around 21 per cent below its peak in the 
March quarter 2008.
Daily average for half-year
RITS Payments and Liquidity*
* March 2013 is six-months-to-date
** Measured as total daily average liquidity over real-time gross settlement
payments value as a percentage; RITS liquidity is measured as opening
exchange settlement account balances with the RBA and average intraday
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Source: RBA
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The availability of sufficient liquidity is essential for 
the smooth operation of RITS. Intraday liquidity 
in RITS increased substantially over the past year, 
owing to higher intraday repurchase agreements 
with the RBA. This increased liquidity has enabled a 
larger share of transactions to settle earlier in the day 
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Margin held at the central counterparties provides 
an indication of the aggregate risk of open positions 
held in normal market conditions. Despite a decrease 
in the volume of derivatives contracts traded over 
the second half of 2012, margin held on derivatives 
positions cleared by ASX Clear increased slightly 
due to an increase in margin rates (Graph 2.26). 
The increased margin rates reflect a change to ASX 
Clear’s margining system in December, as well as an 
increase in price volatility for underlying stocks in the 
resources and financial sectors. Both upward and 
downward margin rate adjustments were made for 
derivatives cleared by ASX Clear (Futures) during the 
second half of 2012. However, increased position-
taking by participants coupled with an increase 
in the margin rate on one actively traded contract 
resulted in higher margin held overall.
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Box A 
Australian Bank Activity  
in Asia
The large Australian-owned banks have significantly 
increased their activity in Asia over recent years. 
One indicator of this is the consolidated data in 
the International Banking Statistics, which show 
that the aggregate claims (i.e. exposures) of all 
Australian-owned banks on the Asian region were 
$112 billion at December 2012, up from $27 billion 
five years earlier (Graph A1).1 Almost all of these 
claims are due to the four major banks. As a share of 
their global consolidated assets, Australian-owned 
banks’ claims on Asia rose from 1.2  per cent to 
3.6 per cent over this period. While their non-Asian 
foreign claims are still a much higher share of their 
global consolidated assets, at around 19  per cent, 
this share has been declining (see ‘The Australian 
Financial System’ chapter). The Australian banks have 
recorded strong growth in their exposures to a range 
of Asian countries over recent years, although the 
bulk of their exposures are to the financial centres 
of Singapore and Hong Kong, as well as China and 
Japan, the two largest economies in the region.
A key motivation for the Australian major banks’ 
expansion into Asia is to facilitate the large and 
growing trade and investment flows between 
Australia and the Asian region. Accordingly, the 
banks have been focusing on providing cross-border 
banking services (such as trade finance and foreign 
exchange) to their corporate clients engaged in 
trade and other business in Asia, as well as to Asian 
1 Banks’ consolidated on-balance sheet foreign claims in this box are 
measured on an ‘immediate risk’ basis – that is, claims are based on the 
country in which the immediate counterparty resides. Foreign claims 
can also be measured on an ‘ultimate risk’ basis, which are immediate 
risk claims adjusted (via guarantees and other risk transfers) to reflect 
the country where the counterparty risk ultimately resides. Data on 
Australian-owned banks’ foreign claims are collected by the Australian 
Prudential Regulation Authority as an input to the Bank for International 
Settlements’ International Banking Statistics. They are available on the 
RBA website in Statistical Tables B11.2, and B13.1 to B13.2.1.
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companies with activity in Australia. Some of them 
have also been targeting foreign companies doing 
business in Asia, aiming to capitalise on the large 
and fast-growing intra-Asian trade and investment 
flows. A similar trend has been observed in the other 
direction, with many Asian-owned banks looking to 
increase their involvement in parts of the Australian 
banking market.2 The increased linkages between 
the Australian and Asian banking systems can partly 
be seen as a natural consequence of greater regional 
economic integration.
Consistent with the Australian major banks’ focus 
on trade and other cross-border banking services, 
the majority of their claims on Asia are recorded as 
‘international claims’, which comprise ‘cross-border’ 
claims (those where the counterparty resides in a 
2 As discussed in ‘The Australian Financial System’ chapter, Asian-owned 
banks’ share of business lending and syndicated lending in Australia 
has increased noticeably over recent years. There are currently 
16  Asian-owned banks with on-the-ground operations in Australia; 
six of these established their operations since 2010, while others have 
a longer-standing presence in the local market.
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different country to the banking entity that booked 
the claim) and local claims of the Australian banks’ 
Asian operations that are denominated in foreign 
(i.e. non-local) currency (Table A1). This is in contrast 
to the major banks’ main overseas markets, New 
Zealand and the United Kingdom, where most of 
their claims are booked through local operations 
and are claims on local residents denominated in 
the local currency.
The bulk of the Australian banks’ international claims 
on Asia have less than 12 months to maturity; this 
is likely to partly reflect their provision of trade 
facilities, which typically have short maturities of 
up to 180 days. Some trade facilities, such as letters 
of credit, are off-balance sheet exposures though, 
and are therefore not included in these claims data. 
Short-dated trade facilities typically pose smaller 
funding and credit risks to banks than long-term 
lending, and margins on these facilities therefore 
also tend to be relatively low. The escalation of the 
euro area debt crisis and the associated pullback of 
some euro area banks from the Asian region in 2011 
and early 2012 created opportunities for Australian 
banks to expand their trade financing business in 
the Asian region. More recently, the improvement in 
global market sentiment and increased competition 
from other banks in the region have reportedly 
contributed to a tightening of margins in these 
markets. Australian banks are also involved in the 
provision of long-term corporate loans in Asia, such 
as through their participation in syndicated lending, 
although to a lesser extent than some large Asian 
banks that are expanding in the Asian region.
While increasing their institutional and corporate 
business in Asia has been the primary focus of the 
major Australian banks, some of them have also 
been expanding into retail banking in a number of 
Asian jurisdictions, including Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam. In doing so, the 
banks have generally targeted certain segments of 
the retail market, such as more affluent customers 
or those with links to Australia, partly because of the 
difficulties competing with the larger incumbent 
banks in the broader retail market.
While all of the major Australian banks have increased 
their activity in the Asian region over recent years, 
ANZ has accounted for a large part of the growth 
and its overall exposure to Asia is much bigger than 
those of the other banks. Building a larger presence 
in Asia is a key component of ANZ’s ‘super regional’ 
strategy that it adopted in 2007. The other major 
Table A1: Australian-owned Banks’ Claims on Asia
Consolidated global operations, immediate risk basis, $ billion
December 2007 December 2012
Claims by type
International claims(a) 21 65
of which: (b)
0–3 months 10 35
3–12 months 3 11
Greater than 12 months 8 19
Local claims in local currency 6 47
Total claims 27 112
(a)  Cross-border claims plus local claims denominated in foreign currency; cross-border claims are those where the counterparty 
resides in a different country to the banking entity where the claim is booked
(b) Residual maturity basis
Sources: APRA; RBA
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Australian banks are also looking to grow their 
businesses in Asia, but their expansion strategies 
tend to be more focused on providing cross-border 
banking services and less on opening Asian retail 
and corporate banking operations.
Australian banks have used a variety of business 
structures to expand into Asia. Banks’ initial moves 
into Asian markets have tended to involve opening 
representative offices or taking minority stakes in 
existing banks, with the aim of acquiring knowledge 
about local banking conditions and customs before 
embarking on more extensive expansions. Over 
recent years, the banks have increasingly established 
local branch and subsidiary operations in Asia: the 
large Australian banks now hold branch banking 
licences in a range of jurisdictions (most commonly 
China, Hong Kong, India, Japan and Singapore), 
while ANZ has subsidiary banking licences in 
Cambodia, China, Indonesia, Laos and Vietnam (CBA 
also has a subsidiary in Indonesia). Some of these 
local operations were the result of acquisitions, most 
notably ANZ’s purchase of parts of Royal Bank of 
Scotland’s operations in Asia in 2009–2010.
A notable feature of the Australian banks’ operations 
in Asia is that local deposits account for a large share 
of their funding. Banks’ deposit funding exceeds 
their lending in many of their Asian operations; 
surplus funding appears to be mainly placed in cash 
and liquid assets. These balance sheet patterns are 
reasonably common among banks operating in Asia 
given the high saving rates in many of the Asian 
economies, reinforced by prudential caps on loan-
to-deposit ratios in a few cases.
Australian bank activity in Asia is likely to continue 
to expand over the longer term as trade and 
investment between Australia and Asia grow, and 
banks look to capitalise on growth opportunities 
in Asian banking systems. If expansion into Asia 
helps increase and diversify the Australian banks’ 
earnings then this could be beneficial for them 
and, potentially, for financial stability. However, 
moving into any new market poses a range of risks 
that banks need to manage carefully. These risks 
would probably be heightened if expansion were 
overly rapid and not backed by a deliberate and 
well-founded strategy.  R
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3. Business and household  
 Balance Sheets
Overall, financial stability risks emanating from the 
domestic business and household sectors remain 
limited by the generally good condition of these 
sectors’  balance sheets. This follows a period of softer 
demand for debt by both sectors since the global 
financial crisis.
Low gearing in the business sector has helped 
to mitigate some of the risks associated with the 
softening in business conditions and profitability 
over the past six months. Weaker conditions have 
been evident across a number of industries, but 
particularly the mining sector, following large falls in 
commodity prices last year. This has flowed through 
to parts of the non-mining sector, while some 
industries are also facing ongoing pressures from a 
persistently high exchange rate and softer consumer 
demand. This sometimes challenging environment 
has contributed to higher business failure rates, 
but despite this, the recovery in banks’ business 
loan performance has continued, supported by the 
generally solid financial position of the business 
sector.
The household sector has continued to display a more 
prudent approach to its finances than in the period 
prior to the global financial crisis, characterised by a 
return to more normal saving patterns and reduced 
appetite for borrowing and investment risk. Many 
households have been taking advantage of the lower 
interest-rate environment to repay existing debt 
more quickly than required and to build mortgage 
buffers. Consistent with this, housing loan arrears 
rates have continued to improve across most parts 
of the country and other indicators of household 
financial stress remain low. Nonetheless, household 
indebtedness and gearing remain around historically 
high levels. It would therefore be undesirable from a 
financial stability perspective if households were to 
exhibit less prudent behaviour than they have over 
the past few years.
Business Sector
Business conditions and profitability
Overall conditions in the business sector have 
softened over the past six months. Survey measures 
imply that conditions are now a bit below average 
in most industries; reported conditions deteriorated 
sharply in the mining sector following falls in bulk 
commodity prices through much of 2012, although 
prices have subsequently recovered somewhat 
(Graph 3.1). The softening of conditions in the mining 
sector is also likely to have weighed on conditions 
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in related industries, such as business services (see 
also ‘Box B: The Financial Condition of Companies 
Servicing the Mining Sector’). At the same time, the 
ongoing challenges of a high exchange rate and a 
return to more traditional borrowing and saving 
behaviour by households have weighed on the 
manufacturing, retail and wholesale trade industries.
This softening in conditions is consistent with 
business profitability moderating over the past year. 
The national accounts measure of non-financial 
corporate profits declined by 9 per cent over 
the year to the December quarter 2012. This was 
driven by mining firms, for which aggregate profits 
fell by about 25  per cent, to be slightly below 
their average share of GDP over the past decade 
(Graph  3.2). Profits of the non-mining sector rose 
by 2 per cent over this period, although there was 
considerable divergence across industries: profits 
fell sharply for manufacturing and wholesale firms, 
but grew solidly for transport companies. The share 
of large listed companies reporting losses remains 
somewhat elevated, but below its peak in the crisis 
period. Market analysts continue to downgrade their 
earnings expectations for the coming financial year, 
with these downgrades having been particularly 
sharp for the mining sector. 
In contrast to larger businesses, surveys indicate 
that conditions experienced by small businesses 
Graph 3.2
improved slightly towards the end of 2012. National 
accounts data suggest that unincorporated 
businesses’ profits declined by less than for corporates 
over the year to the December quarter 2012, which 
partly reflects the lower share of mining companies 
in the unincorporated sector. Data for unlisted 
companies from credit bureau Dun & Bradstreet 
suggest that profitability for construction firms 
declined the most over the past year and has trended 
down since 2007. The share of unlisted firms making 
losses declined by 1 percentage point in the 2011/12 
financial year, but at 21 per cent it remained slightly 
above its decade average.
The difficult operating environment being faced by 
some businesses is also evident in the commercial 
property sector, a sector to which the banking 
system has sizeable exposures. The pace of the 
recovery in commercial property rents and prices 
slowed in 2012, and conditions generally remain 
weaker than prior to the crisis across the main market 
segments (Graph  3.3). In the CBD office market, 
where conditions had improved the most over the 
past few years, rents have fallen in recent quarters 
and vacancy rates have begun to increase again. 
The increase in office vacancy rates over the second 
half of 2012 was driven by weaker tenant demand 
across most capital cities, and followed large supply 
additions in the first half, particularly in Perth and 
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Brisbane. While there is some new supply in the 
pipeline, private non-residential building activity has 
been fairly weak compared with the run-up prior to 
the financial crisis, and the outlook for construction 
in the near term is subdued: non-residential building 
approvals in the second half of 2012 were below 
their average level since the early 1990s as a per 
cent of GDP, and survey measures of investment 
intentions are weak. 
In line with the general softening in business 
conditions and profitability, business failure rates 
have been above average recently. The bankruptcy 
rate among unincorporated businesses has drifted 
up over the past three years (Graph 3.4). This reflects 
both an increase in the number of bankruptcies 
and a decline in the number of unincorporated 
businesses, particularly self-employed construction 
workers. Other kinds of business-related personal 
administrations, as a share of unincorporated 
businesses, have collectively also drifted up over the 
same period. The insolvency rate for incorporated 
businesses is also elevated, though it is below 
recent peaks and still well below the level observed 
in the early 1990s. Incorporated business failures 
have been concentrated in the construction and 
services sectors, and by state have been highest in 
Queensland and New South Wales, and have been 
climbing in Western Australia. For both incorporated 
and unincorporated businesses, the share of failures 
attributed to economic conditions has increased in 
recent years, though most incorporated business 
failures are still attributed to other factors, such as 
weakness in business management. 
Financing and balance sheet position
Firms’  internal funding available to finance 
investment has declined alongside the decline in 
profitability. The quarterly flow of internal funding 
has slowed since the September quarter 2011, but it 
remains above its long-run average as a share of GDP 
(Graph  3.5). Among listed corporates, the mining 
sector drove most of the fall in internal funding (given 
the sector’s sharp fall in profits), although retained 
earnings continue to be an important source of 
funding for that sector (Graph  3.6). The mining 
sector has also been able to access bond markets to 
help fund its large investment pipeline: mining firms 
accounted for more than half of all bond issuance 
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large loans; a split by (typically larger) incorporated 
businesses and smaller, unincorporated businesses 
suggests it was driven by a decline in incorporated 
business lending. 
The overall weakness in business credit in recent 
quarters seems to be mainly due to weak demand 
rather than supply constraints. As noted, some 
larger businesses have been tapping bond markets 
instead of borrowing from banks, with businesses 
taking advantage of the more favourable terms 
they can obtain in bond markets than from financial 
intermediaries such as banks. In addition, liaison 
with firms indicates that many businesses are still 
seeking to pay down debt rather than increase 
borrowings. There are, however, reports that banks 
have tightened their lending standards to certain 
segments of the business sector in response to 
weaker outlooks, such as some parts of the mining 
sector. This may have resulted in unmet demand for 
intermediated credit in some sectors: smaller firms in 
more risky segments that traditionally do not have 
access to bond markets tend to be those that are 
reporting difficulty in obtaining finance.
Unlike in previous years, the continued deleveraging 
by some businesses in response to weak conditions 
has not been accompanied by strong equity raisings. 
Both IPOs and issuance of new equity by existing 
firms remained subdued in the second half of 2012, 
while buybacks continued to pick up and broadened 
beyond resources companies.
Deleveraging by many businesses in recent years 
has resulted in stronger balance sheets and has 
enhanced the resilience of the business sector 
to the current weaker conditions. In line with 
limited growth in business credit, business sector 
gearing has remained at relatively low levels 
(Graph  3.8). Among listed non-financial corporates, 
the aggregate gearing (book value debt-to-
equity) ratio is estimated to have increased by 
5  percentage points over the year to December 
2012, to 54  per cent. The increase was mainly due 
to the bond-funded expansions of a few mining 
by Australian non-financial corporates in 2012. Total 
issuance was quite strong in the year, at about 2 per 
cent of GDP, as firms took advantage of ongoing 
foreign appetite for corporate debt, yields at decade 
lows and the narrowest spreads over government 
bonds in several years.
In contrast to non-intermediated debt, growth in 
intermediated business credit has been subdued. 
After rising by about 3  per cent over the first half 
of 2012, business credit has been broadly flat since 
then (Graph 3.7). The recent weakness was evident 
across a range of industries, and for both small and 
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stable for the past 18 months at around 33 per cent, 
as the effect of declining indebtedness has offset a 
moderation in profits.
Loan performance
Although overall business conditions and 
profitability have weakened recently, banks’ business 
loan performance has continued to improve 
over recent quarters, supported by the healthy 
condition of businesses’ balance sheets (discussed 
above). As discussed in ‘The Australian Financial 
System’ chapter, the non-performing share of 
banks’ business loans has continued to decline 
from its peak in 2010 (Graph 3.9). The recent decline 
was driven by loans to incorporated businesses, 
which had also accounted for much of the earlier 
increase. Data for the six months to September 2012 
from the major banks’ Pillar  3 reports show that 
performance improved most noticeably for loans to 
the construction, and property and business services 
sectors, partially offset by weaker performance of 
loans to the manufacturing sector. Despite the 
recent improvement, the share of non-performing 
loans is still above pre-crisis levels, and if the rate of 
business failures were to remain elevated it may limit 
further improvement in loan performance.
Much of the improvement in banks’ business loan 
performance was accounted for by commercial 
companies; gearing was steady or fell for around 
half of listed firms. Infrastructure companies remain 
highly geared relative to the overall listed sector, 
reflecting business models that tend to rely more 
on debt financing. Aggregate leverage for listed real 
estate investment trusts (REITs) has declined from 
a peak of 113 per cent in the second half of 2008, 
to around 50  per cent in December  2012. Dun & 
Bradstreet data suggest that gearing in the unlisted 
business sector declined over the year to June 2012: 
the median gearing ratio for that sector fell to 31 per 
cent among the 2012 sample of firms, down from 
39  per cent in 2011, and well below the pre-crisis 
average of 57 per cent.
Consistent with low leverage and the recent falls 
in interest rates, the debt-servicing ratio (DSR) 
for the business sector overall remains below its 
long-run average level. However, the DSR for listed 
companies increased a little over the second half 
of 2012. This was driven by the increased debt 
and lower profitability of resources companies, 
with that sector’s DSR rising to around 7  per cent, 
slightly above its average since the late  1990s. The 
DSR remains highest for infrastructure companies, 
reflecting their higher gearing, though at around 
40  per cent this ratio remains well below its 2008 
peak. The aggregate DSR for REITs has been relatively 
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property loans, which make up around one-third of 
banks’ total business lending. The performance of 
these loans has improved at a faster pace than that 
of other business loans, partly reversing their earlier 
disproportionate deterioration; the impairment 
rate on banks’ commercial property exposures was 
around 3½ per cent in December 2012, down from 
a peak of about 6 per cent in September 2010. This 
decline in impairments was driven by a steep fall 
in the impairment rate for loans to retail property, 
partly reflecting the 2011 restructuring of the former 
Centro Property Group. 
Following the sharp fall from their 2009 peak, banks’ 
total outstanding commercial property exposures 
have been broadly unchanged since late  2010 
(Graph  3.10). The major banks have, however, 
increased their exposures over the past 18 months: 
their outstanding loans are now just 6  per cent 
below their peak. This has been mostly offset by 
a continued reduction in commercial property 
exposures of European banks. Foreign banks have 
reportedly sold much of their distressed commercial 
property loan portfolios to hedge funds and other 
distressed debt investors. Domestic banks appear to 
have taken a measured approach to resolving some 
of their troubled exposures in order to avoid putting 
additional pressure on market valuations.
household Sector
Saving and borrowing behaviour
In recent quarters the household sector has 
maintained the more prudent approach to its 
finances that has been evident over the past few 
years. One indicator of this is the household saving 
ratio, which has stabilised at around 10 per cent, well 
above the average for the past 20 years (Graph 3.11). 
This could be characterised as a return to more 
normal saving behaviour after the previous two 
decades of adjustment to disinflation, lower interest 
rates and financial deregulation. It is unlikely that 
the saving ratio will return to the higher rates of the 
1960s and 1970s, partly because unincorporated 
enterprises – which tend to save more than employee 
households – were a bigger share of the economy at 
that time. Part of this shift in saving behaviour may 
reflect the changes in households’ attitudes towards 
their finances that have been persistent since the 
financial crisis. 
The more prudent approach to finances can also be 
seen in households’ reduced appetite for taking on 
additional debt since the financial crisis (Graph 3.12). 
Household credit growth has been slower in 
the past five years – at an average annual rate of 
around 5½ per cent – than in the 20 years prior, when 
it averaged around 13½ per cent. Within household 
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facilities – are now estimated to be equivalent to 
around 14 per cent of the outstanding stock of 
housing loans (Graph 3.13). When interest rates fall, 
not all borrowers reduce their mortgage payments, 
resulting in an increase in prepayment rates. The 
increase in the rate of prepayment as a result of the 
decline in mortgage lending rates since late 2011 
is estimated to have reduced the growth rate of 
housing credit by around ½ percentage point over 
2012.
Graph 3.12
Graph 3.13
credit, personal credit has declined over the past five 
years, with a large fall in margin loans partially offset 
by modest growth in credit card debt. Growth in 
housing credit has also slowed over this period, to 
a current annual rate of around 4½ per cent despite 
a moderate pick-up in the value of housing loan 
approvals in the past few years. The slower pace of 
credit growth has been outpaced by income growth 
in the past couple of years, resulting in the household 
debt-to-income ratio falling slightly, to 148 per cent, 
after peaking at 153  per cent in late 2006. Real 
household disposable income growth has recently 
slowed a little, however, to 2 per cent over the year to 
the December quarter 2012. This modest growth in 
income, combined with the decline in interest rates 
and slower credit growth, has reduced the share of 
disposable income used to make interest payments 
to an estimated 9½ per cent in the March quarter 
2013. Household indebtedness and gearing are 
still around historically high levels though, so from 
the perspective of their financial resilience it would 
be preferable if households maintained this more 
prudent behaviour.
Contributing to the slower pace of credit growth 
is the fact that many households have been taking 
advantage of the lower interest rate environment to 
pay down their debt faster than required. Mortgage 
buffers – balances in mortgage offset and redraw 
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Measured a different way, in aggregate, households’ 
mortgage buffers are equivalent to around 20 months 
of scheduled repayments (principal plus interest) at 
current interest rates. This provides considerable 
scope for many borrowers to continue to meet their 
loan repayments even during a temporary spell of 
unemployment or reduced income. As with housing 
loans, households have also been paying off credit 
card debt; net repayments on personal credit and 
charge cards have been above average in recent 
years and balances on personal credit cards have 
also slightly declined since mid 2012. 
Wealth and investment preferences
The higher household saving ratio has contributed 
to the rebuilding of household wealth in recent 
quarters following the falls in asset prices over the 
few years prior (Graph  3.14). Real net worth per 
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household rose by an estimated 3½ per cent over the 
year to March 2013, to be about 6½ per cent below 
its 2007 peak. Most of the rise was in the financial 
assets component; continued net inflows into 
deposits and superannuation were accompanied 
by positive valuation effects associated with the 
recovery in share prices, particularly since the middle 
of 2012. There has also been a recent pick-up in the 
value of housing assets, with the average dwelling 
price rising by around 4 per cent since its trough in 
May 2012. After the weakness of the past few years, 
there are some signs that a recovery in housing 
markets now seems to be underway in most capital 
cities, with auction clearance rates and rental 
yields increasing throughout 2012 and in 2013 to 
date. Assuming household credit growth remains 
subdued, the recovery in dwelling and share prices 
is likely to reduce the household debt-to-assets ratio.
As yet there is little sign that the recent recovery 
in asset prices has encouraged households to shift 
away from their more cautious financial behaviour 
of recent years or to make less conservative 
investment choices. Data for the September 
quarter 2012 (the latest data available at the time 
of publication) showed a further net outflow from 
households’ direct equity holdings over the past 
year, albeit less than in recent years, while flows into 
deposits remained close to their decade average 
(Graph 3.15). More recent survey data show most 
households continue to favour deposits as the 
‘wisest place’ for their savings. Regardless of their 
financial preferences, from an investor protection 
perspective, it is always important for households to 
understand and appropriately manage the risks they 
take. The recent failure of a number of small finance 
companies that issued unlisted debentures to retail 
investors highlights some of the challenges in this 
area (see the chapter on ‘The Australian Financial 
System’ for more detail). 
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Despite a modest increase in the unemployment rate 
over 2012, the household sector continues to cope 
reasonably well with meeting its debt obligations. 
The non-performing share of housing loans – loans 
that are past due or impaired – has continued to fall 
since peaking in June 2011 (Graph 3.16). This decline 
has been driven by the continued fall in the past-due 
share of loans, to 0.5 per cent in December 2012. 
Some financial institutions have indicated that they 
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do not anticipate much, if any, further improvement 
in housing loan performance over the coming 
year, because the effect of lower interest rates is 
expected to be offset by that of ongoing softness in 
the labour market: forward-looking indicators point 
to only modest employment growth in the coming 
months. The non-performance rate for banks’ credit 
card lending has drifted up a little in the past couple 
of years, while the rate for other personal loans has 
been broadly unchanged at a level that is higher 
than its average over the early to mid 2000s. While 
both these loan types are inherently riskier and 
less likely to be secured than housing loans, they 
only account for a small (and declining) share of 
total household credit. A sharp increase in these 
non-performance rates could, however, provide an 
early signal of borrower stress.
The fall in housing arrears since its 2011 peak is 
comparable to the fall seen after the previous peak 
in 1996, despite less favourable movements recently 
in some factors that can influence housing loan 
performance (Graph 3.17). In the current episode, 
since the peak in arrears dwelling prices have fallen, 
the unemployment rate has increased and the 
decline in the housing interest-servicing ratio has 
been slower and from a higher level than in 1996. 
Following the peak in arrears in 1996, dwelling prices 
rose strongly, the unemployment rate eventually 
Graph 3.18
declined, albeit from a higher level than in 2011, and 
the interest-servicing ratio of households fell sharply. 
At least part of the recent decline in arrears is a 
reversal of flood-related payment difficulties for 
some borrowers, but there is also reason to believe 
that some households might have become more 
resilient to economic shocks. For example, products 
such as home equity loans, redraw facilities and 
offset accounts are more popular than in the 1990s. 
These types of loan products make it easier for 
households to build mortgage buffers, enhancing 
their ability to cope with income shocks. Survey 
data also suggest that those households that are 
financially constrained (unable to make payments 
for essential goods or services, or having to borrow 
money from family or friends) are currently holding a 
smaller share of total owner-occupier housing debt 
than in the late 1990s. As noted above, the changed 
sentiment of households towards their finances 
since the financial crisis has also contributed to a 
shift in their behaviour towards repaying debt. 
At a regional level, data on securitised housing 
loans suggest that arrears rates have declined in 
all mainland states since mid 2011. However, there 
are pockets of weakness, with some regions – such 
as parts of Sydney’s western suburbs – having had 
high arrears rates for a number of years (Graph 3.18). 
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A large share of the housing loans currently in arrears 
nationally was originated during earlier periods of 
rapid dwelling price growth and above-average 
construction activity (Graph 3.19). These periods 
differed by state: the worst-performing loans tend 
to have been originated between 2003 and 2006 
in New South Wales and between 2007 and 2008 in 
Queensland and Western Australia. Encouragingly, 
arrears rates on more recent loan cohorts are lower 
on average than for the overall loan pool. Even the 
2009 cohort has performed well despite it including 
a high proportion of first home buyers (FHBs), whose 
typically higher loan-to-valuation ratios (LVRs) might 
be thought to increase their riskiness.
Other regions with relatively high arrears rates 
include those that have had large dwelling price 
falls and/or that rely on tourism, a sector that has 
been under pressure recently from the persistently 
high exchange rate. Even in some of these regions, 
though, arrears rates have stabilised or started to fall 
in recent months; this has been particularly evident 
in parts of Sydney’s western suburbs and south-east 
Queensland (including the Gold Coast). The arrears 
rate in Hobart increased sharply in late 2011 and early 
2012, and although it has since improved, it remains 
relatively high. The increase was likely to have been 
driven by the increase in the unemployment rate in 
Tasmania at around the same time. While the January 
floods in Queensland and northern New South Wales 
may put some upward pressure on mortgage arrears 
rates in those areas, the effect on the aggregate 
arrears rate is expected to be even smaller than in 
the 2011 floods; in both flooding episodes, hardship 
relief packages (including ‘payment holidays’) were 
put in place by banks to help affected borrowers. 
These packages prevented short-term flood-related 
difficulties from becoming more ongoing problems, 
even if in some cases they temporarily boosted 
reported non-performance rates.
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Although housing loan arrears rates are currently 
low across most parts of Victoria, the outlook for 
the Melbourne property market appears to be 
softer than for other large cities and some banks 
have signalled that they will be alert to any signs 
of deterioration in asset performance. The current 
stock of land for sale is at a high level and building 
approvals data point to increases in the stock of 
housing, and potential oversupply, in some parts 
of Melbourne, particularly the inner-city apartment 
market (Graph 3.20). This is on top of previous 
strong supply of detached housing in the outer 
suburbs. The increase in the stock of housing is 
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to FHBs – which typically have higher LVRs – 
associated with changes in FHB incentives. The share 
of owner-occupier housing loan approvals at fixed 
interest rates has been a little above its long-run 
average in the past six months, at around 13  per 
cent; the average interest rate on new three-year 
fixed-rate mortgages is currently at its lowest level 
since the series began in the early 1990s, at around 
20  basis points below the average discounted 
package rate on new variable-rate mortgages. 
Low-doc loans continue to decline as a share of the 
overall market, accounting for just 1 per cent of new 
loan approvals in the December quarter 2012. The 
decrease in low-doc lending over the past few years 
partly reflects the introduction of, and subsequent 
amendments to, the National Consumer Credit 
Protection  Act 2009, which has strengthened the 
responsible lending obligations on lenders, such as 
those on verifying that borrowers can reasonably 
meet their debt commitments. The interest-only 
share of total housing loan approvals has been 
broadly steady in recent years, at around 35 per cent; 
many of these loans include features that encourage 
the building of mortgage buffers, such as redraw 
and offset facilities.
The increasing financial resilience of the household 
sector is evident across a range of other indicators, 
consistent with Melbourne dwelling prices declining 
further and recovering less of their earlier decline 
than prices in most other capital cities have done. 
Available information suggests that the quality of 
new housing loans being written should support 
future loan performance. As noted in the chapter 
‘The Australian Financial System’, a number of banks 
have recently responded to the decline in mortgage 
interest rates to below-average levels by increasing 
the interest rate buffers they use in assessing the 
capacity of households to service their mortgage. 
For example, it is now reportedly common for 
banks to test loan serviceability using interest rates 
around 1¾ to 2 percentage points higher than their 
discounted standard variable rates, whereas buffers 
around ¼ to ½ percentage point less than this were 
more common a year ago. Increasing these buffers 
limits the increase in borrowing capacity as interest 
rates fall, which implies that borrowers would be 
better able to manage the increase in repayments if 
interest rates were to rise.
Aside from this change in interest rate buffers, data 
on the characteristics of new housing loan approvals 
suggest that banks have broadly maintained the 
risk profile of their mortgage lending in recent 
quarters. By value, the share of new housing loan 
approvals with LVRs above 90 per cent has remained 
fairly steady at around 14 per cent since late 2011 
(Graph  3.21). This is despite a fall in loan approvals 
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consistent with the overall improving trend in 
housing loan arrears. In 2012, applications for 
lender property possession – which typically occur 
after borrowers have failed to service their debt for 
a number of months – declined as a share of the 
dwelling stock, and are now below recent peaks in all 
the states for which data are available (Graph 3.22). 
Non-business related personal administrations – 
which include bankruptcies, debt agreements and 
personal insolvency agreements – as a share of the 
adult population also remain below recent peaks in 
all states and territories.
Consistent with these aggregate indicators, 
household-level data from the latest Household, 
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) 
Survey (for 2011) continue to show that there is 
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only a small share of highly geared borrowers and 
that most households are well placed to meet their 
debt obligations. For example, around 15 per cent of 
indebted owner-occupier households had a housing 
gearing ratio greater than 80 per cent in 2011, a 
share that has been broadly steady over the past few 
years. The subset of highly geared households that 
also have high DSRs – and are thus more vulnerable 
to interest rate increases and income shocks – was 
around 3½ per cent in 2011 and has likely fallen 
along with interest rates in 2012 (Graph 3.23). Of 
these households, around 40  per cent report that 
they have built up some buffer by being ahead of 
schedule on their mortgage repayments, suggesting 
that the share of households that are most vulnerable 
is even lower at around 2 per cent.
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Box B 
The Financial Condition of Companies  
Servicing the Mining Sector
Graph B1Falls in commodity prices during 2012 led to a 
reassessment of the conditions and outlook for the 
mining sector. As a result, mining companies have 
scaled back their investment plans, with the peak in 
mining investment as a share of GDP now expected 
to be lower and to occur earlier than had previously 
been forecast.
While this highlights a degree of downside risk 
to mining revenue, which could have important 
flow-on implications for macroeconomic activity, 
the direct implications of the revised mining sector 
outlook for the financial system are likely to be 
limited; mining companies are typically not highly 
geared and make little use of intermediated debt 
(Graph  B1).1 However, there could in principle be 
indirect implications via companies that service 
the mining industry, given that these companies 
have tended to rely more on intermediated debt 
to fund their investment and are somewhat more 
highly geared, on average, than mining companies. 
A significant reduction in demand for mining-related 
services may therefore mean that some mining 
services companies could face greater difficulties 
in repaying their debt; this could lead to loan losses 
for financial intermediaries even though their overall 
exposure to mining services companies is small. 
This box reviews the financial condition of mining 
services companies in Australia, including their links 
to the banking sector. Overall, the mining services 
sector looks reasonably well placed to weather 
weaker demand for a period and it is therefore 
unlikely to pose a significant financial stability risk.
1 For a more detailed discussion on the funding of investment by 
the resources sector, see Arsov I, B Shanahan and T Williams (2013), 
‘Funding the Australian Resources Investment Boom’, RBA Bulletin, 
March, pp 51–61. 
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Mining services companies are defined broadly in 
this box as those providing products or services to 
the mining sector. These include construction and 
contract mining, and other mining services, such as 
equipment, transport, and consulting and scientific 
services.2
Consistent with the expansion in mining activity and 
investment, the mining services sector has grown 
strongly over the past decade. To meet the demand 
from mining companies, the mining services sector 
has accumulated assets at a considerable pace, 
particularly in the form of plant and equipment 
recently. In line with this, data from company 
financial reports indicate that earnings growth in 
2 The data cover 64 listed companies that have been identified as 
meeting this definition and are in the industrials, materials and 
energy sectors of the Global Industry Classification Standard. These 
companies account for around 6  per cent of the total market 
capitalisation of listed non-financial corporations. The data include 
some large and quite diversified companies, although exposure to 
the mining sector for these companies is still sizeable – at least around 
20 per cent of their revenue.
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Graph B2
the listed mining services industry kept pace with 
the strong earnings growth of the listed mining 
industry between the December half 2003 and the 
December half 2011, at an average annual growth 
rate of around 20  per cent (compared with 13  per 
cent for the broader listed sector) (Graph B2). More 
recently though, earnings of the listed mining sector 
have declined sharply, and the scaling back of 
planned investment expenditure and cost cutting by 
the sector has reduced actual and expected earnings 
of listed mining services companies. One implication 
is that some of the newly acquired capital assets 
of mining services companies might not be fully 
utilised, which could affect the sector’s profits and its 
ability to repay debt.
Because the earnings of the defined group of mining 
services companies are not solely determined by 
mining-related activities, the effect of any downturn 
in mining investment should be partially mitigated 
by demand from other sectors. Indeed, for the larger 
mining services firms, almost half of their revenue is 
estimated to be sourced from non-mining activities. 
The limited available data for smaller mining services 
companies suggest that several have diversified 
revenue streams, though they tend to be more 
reliant on mining-related activities than larger 
firms. Even within the mining-related component, 
revenue is derived from a range of activities. As more 
investment projects are completed in the years 
ahead and additional mining production comes 
on stream, some mining services firms will see 
rising production-related revenue offset declining 
construction-related revenue. 
The financial resilience of the mining services sector, 
as well as the linkages to the financial system, is 
influenced by the composition of these companies’ 
funding. In the early to mid 2000s, mining services 
companies tended to rely on a fairly stable mix 
of debt and equity to fund their growth. But their 
funding became increasingly concentrated in debt 
in the lead-up to the crisis, resulting in an increase 
in aggregate gearing (Graph  B3). After a period of 
deleveraging in the aftermath of the crisis, which 
was also evident in the broader listed non-financial 
sector, the mining services sector has begun to rely 
on debt funding again in the past few years. That 
said, at around 60  per cent, the aggregate gearing 
ratio of mining services firms is still only around 
its historical average. It is notably higher than the 
aggregate gearing ratio among mining companies, 
but only slightly higher than for the broader listed 
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Graph B4
non-financial sector. Despite increased debt, 
because of low interest rates and strong earnings 
the proportion of earnings used to service debt is 
currently quite low, at around 10 per cent.
Within debt funding, the portion that is 
intermediated is the principal channel through 
which weakness in the mining services sector could 
have an effect on the banking sector. Even for the 
10 largest mining services companies that have 
access to bond markets, bank loans account for 
about 40 per cent of their total debt, on average, and 
equipment finance arrangements (sourced largely 
through banks) account for a further 6  per cent. 
Much of this borrowing is in the form of syndicated 
loans, however, meaning that the credit risk is spread 
across a number of financial institutions. By contrast, 
smaller mining services companies generally do not 
have access to bond markets. They are therefore 
more reliant on intermediated credit; bank loans and 
equipment finance arrangements account for most 
of their debt (Graph B4). 
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Overall, despite the recent increase in debt, its low 
gearing and debt-servicing ratios suggest that the 
mining services sector is fairly well placed to cope 
with a period of weaker demand. Additionally, 
diversification in sources of revenue should shield 
the sector somewhat from any deterioration in 
mining-related investment demand. Given this, and 
combined with the small overall exposure of financial 
intermediaries to both the mining and mining 
services sectors, a slowing in mining investment is 
unlikely to have substantial near-term implications 
from a financial stability perspective, either directly 
or through the more indirect channel described here. 
As always though, lenders will need to appropriately 
provision for any doubtful exposures, allowing for 
any deterioration in the outlook for the industry.  R
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4.  Developments in the Financial  
System architecture
At the international level, financial regulatory 
reform has been progressing on a number of fronts, 
including: developing a policy framework to deal 
with the risks posed by shadow banking systems; 
modifying aspects of the Basel III liquidity standard; 
addressing the ‘too big to fail’ problem posed by 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs); 
and reforming over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives 
markets. There has also been more focus recently 
on the implementation of agreed reforms at the 
national level and monitoring the consistency of 
implementation internationally. In Australia, this 
has been evident in the finalisation of prudential 
standards to implement the Basel III capital 
requirements, which took effect from the beginning 
of this year, and the passage of legislation that will 
help meet Australia’s commitment to move towards 
greater central clearing and reporting of OTC 
derivative transactions. In late 2012, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) released its Financial Sector 
Assessment Program (FSAP) report on Australia, 
which contained a positive overall assessment of 
the stability of Australia’s financial sector and the 
quality of domestic financial supervisory and crisis 
management arrangements.
International Regulatory 
Developments and australia
Shadow banking
The Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the 
international standard-setting bodies have been 
continuing their work to develop a policy framework 
to address the risks posed by shadow banking 
systems. Preliminary policy recommendations have 
been developed to strengthen the oversight and 
regulation of such systems covering five main areas.
 • Reducing the risks posed by banks’ interactions 
with shadow banking entities. Steps include: 
developing better guidance on the scope 
of consolidation for prudential purposes; 
introducing a revised large exposures regime for 
banks to limit interconnectedness with shadow 
banking entities; and developing a more 
risk-sensitive capital treatment for banks’ equity 
investments in managed funds. Work in this area 
is being handled by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) and detailed policy 
recommendations are to be developed by mid 
2013.
 • Introducing common standards for the 
regulation of money market funds (MMFs), 
including for these funds’ valuation methods, 
liquidity management and disclosures. The 
standards also address the issue of MMFs that 
offer a stable net asset value (NAV), as is common 
in the United States, which exposes them to the 
risk of investor ‘runs’ of the kind seen during 
the crisis. The International Organization of 
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) released its final 
policy recommendations on MMFs in October 
2012, including that stable NAV funds convert to 
a floating NAV (which is the main type of MMF 
in Australia), where workable. Where conversion 
is not possible, IOSCO recommended that stable 
NAV funds be subject to additional safeguards 
to enhance their resilience to significant 
redemptions and to internalise the costs arising 
from any associated risks. 
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 •  Introducing risk-retention and enhanced 
disclosure requirements (including standardised 
templates for asset-level disclosure) for 
securitisation products. This work was also 
led by IOSCO, which released final policy 
recommendations in November 2012.
 •  Developing a policy framework for shadow 
banking entities other than MMFs. The FSB’s 
proposed framework has three parts: an 
assessment by authorities of shadow banking 
entities based on the economic functions they 
perform (rather than legal names or forms); a 
menu of policy tools, tailored to those economic 
functions, to address the risks posed by these 
entities; and an information-sharing process to 
ensure a degree of international consistency 
in applying the proposed framework. The 
proposed policy tools cover a range of measures. 
For example, loan providers (such as finance 
companies) could face capital and liquidity 
requirements and, where they take deposits, 
could be subject to even tighter bank-like 
regulation. There is expected to be enough 
flexibility in the framework that tools would 
only be applied when deemed necessary by 
authorities.
 •  A series of recommendations for securities 
lending and repurchase agreements (‘repos’). 
These include: improved regulatory reporting, 
market transparency and corporate disclosures; 
introduction of minimum standards for haircut 
practices (including possible numerical floors); 
and evaluation by national authorities of the 
costs and benefits of introducing central 
counterparties (CCPs) in securities lending and 
repo markets.
The policy recommendations for the latter two areas, 
which are overseen by the FSB, are currently being 
refined following a public consultation process. The 
FSB expects to present final recommendations in all 
five areas to the G20 Leaders’ Summit in September 
2013.
The shadow banking recommendations will allow 
for discretion in how countries adopt them. Once 
they are finalised, regulators in Australia will need 
to assess the relevance of the recommendations 
in the context of Australia’s relatively small and 
declining shadow banking sector (see ‘The 
Australian Financial System’ chapter). The failure of 
an Australian retail debenture issuer and property 
lender in late 2012, and others like it in recent years, 
prompted a review of the regulatory framework for 
these types of finance companies, which are one 
of the main types of intermediaries considered to 
be shadow banking entities in Australia. Given that 
retail debenture issuers are a very small segment 
of the Australian financial system, they are mainly 
relevant from an investor protection, rather than 
financial stability, standpoint. The government 
asked the Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) and the Australian Prudential 
Regulation Authority (APRA) to consult on proposals 
to strengthen the regulation of finance companies 
that issue debentures to retail investors and 
on-lend the invested funds. ASIC recently released 
its specific proposals, which include mandatory 
minimum capital and liquidity requirements for 
issuers, improved ongoing disclosure to investors 
and measures to enhance the ability of trustees 
to monitor the financial performance of issuers 
and compliance with their legal obligations. ASIC’s 
proposals do not involve prudential supervision 
of debenture issuers, thus maintaining a clear 
distinction between the regulatory framework 
applicable to these entities and the more intensive 
prudential regime which APRA applies to authorised 
deposit-taking institutions (ADIs). This distinction 
will be reinforced by APRA’s forthcoming proposals 
to amend the exemption conditions in the Banking 
Act 1959 to restrict retail debenture issuers offering 
‘at-call’ investments and using ‘bank-like’ terms to 
describe their products.
Basel III liquidity reforms
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) is part of the 
package of reforms to banks’ capital and liquidity 
requirements, known as Basel III, released by the 
BCBS in 2010. Since then, a number of elements 
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of the LCR have been subject to review in light of 
further consideration of the potential implications 
of the LCR for financial markets, credit extension 
and economic growth. As a result of this process, 
the BCBS’ oversight body, the Group of Governors 
and Heads of Supervision (GHOS), agreed a number 
of changes to the LCR standard in January this 
year. Overall, the changes represent a relaxation of 
some aspects of the LCR, which should allow banks 
globally to more readily meet the requirements.
The main changes to the LCR standard are that:
 •  the range of assets potentially eligible as high 
quality liquid assets (HQLA) was expanded 
and assumed net outflow rates for a range of 
deposits and liquidity facilities were reduced. The 
additional assets include highly rated corporate 
debt securities, certain equities and residential 
mortgage-backed securities, all with substantial 
haircuts, and only if these asset classes can meet 
the fundamental qualifying test of demonstrable 
liquidity in a crisis. The aggregate of these extra 
assets, after haircuts, will be subject to a limit of 
15 per cent of HQLA;
 •  the LCR can be subject to a phase-in period. 
While the LCR will still commence on 1 January 
2015, the minimum requirement will now begin 
at 60  per cent, rising in equal annual steps of 
10 percentage points to reach 100  per cent 
on 1  January 2019. This graduated approach 
aligns in part with the timetable for the Basel III 
capital reforms. GHOS noted that introducing 
the LCR this way should also minimise potential 
disruptions to recovering banking systems or the 
financing of economic activity; and
 •  banks’ access to their stock of HQLA in periods of 
stress was clarified. 
In addition, the BCBS is to undertake further work on 
the interaction between the LCR and the provision 
of central bank facilities, given that these facilities 
are the most reliable form of liquidity. A separate 
BCBS task force has been established to look at this 
issue, which is being co-chaired by the Reserve 
Bank’s Assistant Governor (Financial System). The 
task force is also examining whether the option of 
using a central bank facility (such as the Committed 
Liquidity Facility in Australia) should be available to 
all jurisdictions or continue to be limited to those 
with insufficient HQLA.
In Australia, APRA had deferred the release of its 
final Basel III liquidity standard until the outcome of 
the BCBS’ deliberations on changes to the LCR was 
known. It is currently considering the implications of 
the recent LCR changes for its own liquidity standard 
and is expected to publish a revised standard for 
consultation in April. 
Systemically important financial 
institutions (SIFIs)
The FSB, along with other international bodies and 
domestic authorities, has continued implementing 
aspects of the policy framework released in 2010 
to address the risks posed by SIFIs. In late 2012, the 
FSB released an updated list of global systemically 
important banks (G-SIBs), in keeping with its 
commitment to update the list each year based on 
more current data. The list is largely unchanged from 
that in 2011, with the number of G-SIBs reduced 
by one to 28 and no Australian-owned bank 
appearing on the list. The new list also showed, for 
the first time, the allocation of the G-SIBs to ‘buckets’ 
corresponding to the level of additional common 
equity loss absorbency (ranging from 1 to 2½ per 
cent of risk-weighted assets) that they will eventually 
be required to hold if they remain G-SIBs. As noted in 
previous Reviews, these requirements will be phased 
in from 2016, initially for those banks identified as 
G-SIBs in 2014.
Progress has been made in implementing several 
other G-SIB measures. For example, cross-border 
crisis management groups (CMGs), comprising the 
home and key host authorities, have now been 
established for nearly all the G-SIBs designated by 
the FSB in 2011, and recovery and resolution plans 
for these firms are also being developed. Under the 
FSB’s Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes 
for Financial Institutions (the Key Attributes), firms 
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are responsible for developing recovery plans to 
restore their financial viability in the event of distress, 
while resolution plans are developed by the firms’ 
home and key host authorities and reviewed within 
CMGs. To allow more time for necessary changes 
to be made to legal frameworks, the time line for 
completion of resolution plans for G-SIBs has been 
extended by six months until June 2013 and the start 
date of the FSB’s resolvability assessment process has 
been delayed until the second half of 2013. The latter 
involves a peer review of the feasibility and credibility 
of putting the resolution plans into operation, which 
is to be undertaken by officials in the home and key 
host authorities of each G-SIB.
The FSB and the international standard-setting 
bodies have continued their work on extending the 
SIFI framework to non-bank financial institutions. The 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors 
(IAIS) issued for consultation policy measures to be 
applied to global systemically important insurers 
(G-SIIs). The proposals are broadly consistent 
with the policy framework for G-SIBs, including 
enhanced supervision, more effective resolution 
regimes and higher loss absorption capacity. The 
IAIS has developed a methodology to identify 
G-SIIs and the FSB is planning to publish an initial 
list of G-SIIs, if any, in April 2013. In consultation 
with IOSCO, the FSB is developing an assessment 
methodology for identifying globally systemic 
non-bank, non-insurance firms which is expected to 
be finalised in late 2013, after a consultation in the 
second half of this year.
Financial conglomerates and  
mortgage insurers
The Joint Forum (comprising the BCBS, the IAIS and 
IOSCO) released revised Principles for the Supervision 
of Financial Conglomerates (the Principles) in 
September 2012. The Principles update those issued 
in 1999 and aim to support consistent supervision of 
conglomerates, particularly those operating across 
borders, while capturing a broader range of activities 
and entities that form part of conglomerate groups. 
Several areas in the revised Principles are of note. For 
example, the Principles emphasise the importance 
of a group-level supervisor being assigned, which 
would be responsible for facilitating coordination 
between various entity-specific supervisors. A 
number of principles have been added in the 
area of corporate governance, for example group 
governance frameworks are expected to include 
policies for avoiding conflicts of interest and 
ensuring that remuneration policies are consistent 
with the group’s risk profile. The risk management 
principles have also been updated to place greater 
emphasis on a group’s ability to measure, manage 
and report on all material risks, including those from 
unregulated entities and activities.
APRA participated in the Joint Forum’s review of 
the Principles. Key aspects of APRA’s framework for 
the supervision of conglomerates (referred to as 
‘Level 3 groups’), which are intended to meet these 
principles, were issued for consultation in December 
2012. APRA’s proposals focus on the requirements for 
group governance and measurement of, and limits 
on, aggregate risk exposures, including intragroup 
transactions and exposures. The proposals aim to 
ensure that APRA’s supervision adequately captures 
the risks to which APRA-regulated institutions within 
Level 3 groups are exposed and which, because of 
the operations or structures of the group, might 
not be adequately captured by existing prudential 
rules. Underpinning the standards is the view that 
governance and risk management practices should 
be consistent across all entities of Level 3 groups that 
could have a material financial or operational impact 
on the group, and adequate systems must be in place 
to monitor intragroup transactions and exposures. 
APRA anticipates consulting on the other elements 
of its framework for the supervision of conglomerate 
groups (i.e. risk management and capital adequacy 
standards) and on reporting requirements 
throughout 2013, with the full prudential framework 
for Level 3 groups to be implemented from 2014.
In February, the Joint Forum released a consultative 
paper on Mortgage Insurance: Market Structure, 
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Underwriting Cycle and Policy Implications. The paper 
examines the interaction of mortgage insurers with 
lenders, particularly in light of the experience since 
the global financial crisis, which highlighted how 
mortgage insurance can be subject to concentrated 
stress in certain extreme events. One of the key 
recommendations is that policymakers should 
consider requiring that lenders and insurers align 
their interests by both sharing in the consequences 
of a loan not performing. In this way, both parties 
will have incentives to strengthen lending standards. 
Other recommendations are directed at supervisors, 
including that they ensure that both lenders and 
insurers maintain strong underwriting standards, 
and that they be alert to and respond to any 
decline in lending standards. In line with this, it 
was further recommended that supervisors apply 
the FSB’s  Principles for Sound Residential Mortgage 
Underwriting Practices to mortgage insurers. In 
Australia, mortgage insurers are supervised by APRA 
and most of the Joint Forum’s recommendations are 
already part of APRA’s supervision.
OTC derivatives reform
As noted in previous Reviews, the G20 committed 
to achieving the reforms to OTC derivatives 
markets (including moving to central clearing of 
standardised OTC derivatives contracts) by the end 
of 2012. However, implementation is ongoing in a 
large number of jurisdictions, with global regulators 
mindful of the need to minimise unintended 
consequences that could arise from rapid and 
significant changes to the functioning of these 
markets. To better understand the impact of these 
reforms, it was recently decided that an international 
macroeconomic impact assessment of the OTC 
derivatives regulatory reforms would be undertaken 
by the Bank for International Settlements; a senior 
Reserve Bank official is on the assessment team. 
Policymakers in smaller markets such as Australia 
have been taking into account the direction of 
the largest jurisdictions when progressing their 
domestic reforms. Given the cross-border nature 
of many OTC derivatives markets, resolving the 
remaining cross-border issues has become a 
priority for many jurisdictions and standard-setting 
bodies. As international standards and guidance 
has been finalised, individual jurisdictions have 
continued to press ahead with implementing these 
reforms. In many cases, this has involved legislative 
change so that mandatory clearing, reporting and 
trading requirements can be imposed on market 
participants.
Further to the extensive consultation and policy 
development work undertaken by the Council of 
Financial Regulators (CFR) over the past two years, 
several steps have been taken in recent months to 
progress OTC derivatives reforms in Australia.
•• •Legislation was passed in December that will 
allow the government (in consultation with 
the regulators) to apply mandatory reporting, 
clearing or platform-based trading requirements 
to specific classes of OTC derivatives contracts. 
These requirements would be implemented by 
supporting rules, which are to be developed and 
administered by ASIC.
•• •The new framework will require enhanced 
consultation and sharing of data among 
Australian financial sector agencies, so the 
legislation also included provisions to enhance 
the Reserve Bank’s information-sharing powers. 
These enhancements will apply to any protected 
(i.e. institution-specific) information received by 
the Bank.
•• •In order to inform any recommendations to the 
government, the relevant regulators (APRA, ASIC 
and the Bank) will periodically assess the need 
for regulatory intervention in the Australian OTC 
derivatives market. As part of this process, a Report 
on the Australian OTC Derivatives Market, was 
published in October 2012. It reviewed the risk 
management practices of market participants 
in the domestic OTC derivatives market, with a 
particular focus on how participants are using 
centralised infrastructure and what scope there 
might be to increase usage of it. The report 
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concluded that industry-led uptake of central 
clearing and trade execution arrangements 
remains appropriate in the short term. It 
acknowledged that, although currently there are 
no licensed entities in Australia offering central 
clearing of the major OTC derivatives contract 
classes to Australian-based participants, there are 
indications that both international and domestic 
providers may soon begin offering such services. 
In December, Treasury published for consultation 
a set of proposals to implement Australia’s G20 
commitments in line with the conclusions in the 
assessment report, particularly on mandatory 
trade reporting.
•• •To support mandatory trade reporting, ASIC 
is developing two sets of rules. The first set are 
Derivative Transaction Rules that will cover the 
institutional and product scope of mandatory 
trade reporting obligations, as well as details 
of how these obligations can be met. ASIC 
recently initiated a consultation on the second 
set, Derivative Trade Repository Rules, which 
relate to the requirements to be met by trade 
repositories licensed under the new framework 
in the Corporations Act 2001. In developing this 
licensing regime, ASIC has taken into account 
elements of the Committee on Payment and 
Settlement Systems (CPSS)-IOSCO Principles for 
Financial Market Infrastructures that are relevant 
to trade repositories.
Not all OTC derivatives are sufficiently standardised 
to be centrally cleared, but their use still requires 
robust risk management practices. For this reason, 
international principles are being developed 
requiring that OTC derivatives that are not centrally 
cleared be collateralised. As discussed in the previous 
Review, a BCBS-IOSCO working group proposed that 
non-centrally cleared derivative transactions involve 
exchanging both variation and initial margin if the 
parties are financial institutions or systemically 
important non-financial institutions. Following 
feedback received during the consultation and 
the completion of a quantitative impact study to 
assess the liquidity costs of the proposal, the BCBS 
and IOSCO recently consulted on a ‘near final’ set 
of principles. The Bank is continuing to monitor the 
development of these principles and, when they 
are finalised, will engage with other regulators and 
market participants on their implementation in 
Australia.
Supervision and resolution of financial 
market infrastructures (FmIs)
Adoption of the CPSS-IOSCO Principles for Financial 
Market Infrastructures (the Principles) into Australia’s 
legal and regulatory framework proceeded over 
the past six months. Following consultation in the 
second half of 2012, the Bank determined revised 
Financial Stability Standards for CCPs and securities 
settlement facilities that are in line with the Principles. 
ASIC also updated its regulatory guide. The revised 
Financial Stability Standards come into force on 
29 March 2013, and the Bank will assess licensed 
clearing and settlement facilities against them for 
the first time later this year. The Bank also intends to 
assess Australia’s systemically important payments 
system, RITS, against the Principles in 2013.
As discussed in the previous Review, the CPSS and 
IOSCO released a consultative report, Recovery and 
Resolution of Financial Market Infrastructures, in 2012. 
This report considered the essential features of 
recovery and resolution regimes for FMIs and sought 
views on how the FSB’s Key Attributes should apply 
to FMIs. A number of jurisdictions are in the process 
of developing resolution regimes for FMIs, drawing 
on this work. In Australia, the CFR recommended 
to the government in February 2012 that ASIC and 
the Bank be given the power to appoint a statutory 
manager to a troubled FMI (also referred to as 
‘step-in’ powers). Work is underway within the CFR to 
develop legislative proposals that would give effect 
to this power as part of a comprehensive resolution 
regime for FMIs, designed in accordance with the Key 
Attributes and along the lines of that in place for ADIs. 
The results of this work will likely have implications 
for ASIC’s and the Bank’s powers and responsibilities 
in this area.
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Credit rating agencies
In the past six months, the FSB has increased its 
focus again on the use of credit ratings. Credit rating 
agencies (CRAs), while not a direct cause of the 
financial crisis, did not adequately alert investors 
to the risks posed by certain financial products, 
particularly structured finance products. While the 
Principles for Reducing Reliance on CRA Ratings (the 
Principles) that were released by the FSB in 2010 
were intended to reduce the potential for ratings to 
be relied on in a mechanistic way, progress among 
FSB members in implementing them has been slow. 
In response, the FSB developed a ‘road map’ for 
accelerating implementation of the Principles, which 
the G20 endorsed in November 2012. The road map 
consists of two streams of work. The first is to reduce 
the mechanistic reliance on CRA ratings in regulatory 
frameworks. Standard-setting bodies and national 
authorities are to identify and reduce references 
to credit ratings in standards, laws and regulations. 
The second is work by authorities to promote and, 
where needed, require that financial institutions 
strengthen and disclose information on their own 
credit risk assessment approaches as a replacement 
for mechanistic reliance on CRA ratings. In addition 
to the road map, the FSB recently started a peer 
review of its members’ progress in implementing the 
Principles.
IOSCO is also undertaking work to address 
weaknesses in CRA business models. In December 
2012 it released two reports: one looking at the 
internal controls designed to ensure the integrity 
of the credit rating process as well as detailing 
procedures for CRAs to manage conflicts of interest; 
and a second that proposed the establishment of 
supervisory colleges for internationally active CRAs. 
In addition, IOSCO is currently reviewing its Code of 
Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies that, 
among other things, seeks to address conflicts of 
interest. 
Peer reviews and implementation 
monitoring
The FSB has continued with its program of ‘thematic’ 
and country peer reviews, as part of its efforts to 
monitor and strengthen adherence to international 
standards. A peer review of resolution regimes is 
expected to be completed soon and, as noted 
above, a review has recently started on the use 
of CRA ratings. In February, the FSB published a 
thematic peer review on risk governance, which took 
stock of risk governance arrangements in financial 
institutions as well as national authorities’ oversight 
of these arrangements. The report highlighted the 
importance of effective risk governance practices in 
financial institutions, involving boards of directors, 
the firm-wide risk management function and the 
independent assessment of risk governance. The 
recent crisis revealed that without the appropriate 
checks and balances provided by the board and 
these functions, a culture of excessive risk-taking 
and leverage was allowed to permeate in many 
institutions. The report lists sound risk governance 
practices and provides several recommendations 
aimed at helping institutions improve their risk 
governance and national authorities to assess its 
effectiveness. Complementing this FSB review 
(which focused mainly on banks), in February the 
IAIS launched a peer review of the corporate and risk 
governance practices of its members. This will assess 
observance and understanding of the Insurance Core 
Principles related to licensing, suitability of persons, 
corporate governance, and risk management and 
internal controls.
In contrast to the cross-country focus of thematic 
peer reviews, the FSB’s country peer reviews focus on 
the implementation and effectiveness of regulatory, 
supervisory or other financial sector standards and 
policies within individual FSB member jurisdictions. 
A senior Bank official is participating in a team 
conducting a country peer review of the United 
Kingdom this year.
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The BCBS is continuing to expand its monitoring of 
implementation of the Basel III reforms, which is built 
around three levels of assessment.
1.  A semiannual review of members’ progress in 
transposing the Basel III minimum requirements 
into domestic regulations. As at mid February 
2013, 11 BCBS member jurisdictions (including 
Australia) had issued final regulations and the 
remaining 16 jurisdictions had tabled draft 
regulations.
2.  Peer reviews of members’ domestic regulations 
to ascertain their consistency with the Basel  III 
minimum requirements. All BCBS members 
will be assessed over time, with priority being 
given to home jurisdictions of G-SIBs. Reviews 
of Japan, the European Union and the United 
States were published in October 2012 and 
Singapore in March 2013. Australia is scheduled 
to be assessed in the second half of 2013.
3.  Reviews of supervisory implementation of the 
Basel  III minimum requirements to ensure that 
the outcomes of the BCBS rules are consistent 
in practice across banks and jurisdictions. The 
purpose is to investigate whether there are 
unintended variations in capital ratios and to 
formulate policy actions, if applicable. The initial 
focus of this work is on banks’ calculation of 
risk-weighted assets (RWAs, or the denominator 
of the capital adequacy ratio), distinguishing 
between differences that reflect actual 
differences in risk or supervisory discretion, and 
those that reflect differences in bank practices 
and modelling.
Over the past year, the BCBS has monitored the 
impact on banks of the Basel III framework in order 
to gather evidence on its dynamics. The analysis 
was based on data provided by 210 banks globally, 
split between those that have Tier  1 capital in 
excess of €3  billion (101 ‘Group  1’ banks) and the 
remainder (‘Group  2’ banks). While the Basel III 
framework sets out transitional arrangements to 
implement the new standards, the latest monitoring 
exercise assumed full implementation of the final 
Basel III package as of 30 June 2012. The results 
indicated that, applying the Basel III changes to 
the definition of capital and RWAs, the average 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital ratio (CET1) of 
Group 1 banks was 8.5  per cent, compared with 
the Basel  III minimum requirement of 4.5 per cent. 
However, some banks had a CET1 ratio below 4.5 per 
cent; in order for all Group  1 banks to exceed this 
minimum, an aggregate increase of €3.7  billion in 
CET1 would be required. This latter figure rises to 
€208  billion for all Group  1 banks to meet a CET1 
target ratio of 7.0  per cent (which will eventually 
be the Basel  III requirement including the capital 
conservation buffer) plus any G-SIB surcharge. These 
capital shortage estimates are significantly less than 
the results of the previous exercise six months ago, 
indicating the progress many banks have made in 
strengthening their capital positions.
Financial Sector assessment Program 
(FSaP) review of australia
As foreshadowed in the previous Review, the IMF 
published the results of its second FSAP review 
of Australia in November 2012. Overall, the FSAP 
contained a positive assessment of the stability 
of Australia’s financial system and the quality 
of domestic financial supervisory and crisis 
management arrangements. The IMF provided a 
number of recommendations that the Australian 
authorities have under consideration. Among these 
was the recommendation that the Reserve Bank 
develop a ‘top-down’ (macro model-based) stress-
testing framework to complement the stress testing 
already performed by APRA. A program of work 
to investigate the feasibility of developing such a 
framework for Australia has now been initiated.
The IMF also made a recommendation to increase 
the transparency of the CFR’s work. While many 
of the issues discussed by the CFR are reported 
in the Financial Stability Review, a dedicated 
website for the CFR has recently been launched 
(www.cfr.gov.au) to improve public understanding 
of the CFR’s work. It includes information on how 
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the CFR operates and highlights some of the key 
policy initiatives progressed by the CFR in recent 
years. It is intended that the website would also be 
a central platform for information during a financial 
distress event, complementing that provided by the 
individual member agencies.
Other Domestic Regulatory 
Developments 
Prudential reforms
In addition to finalising the Basel III capital standards 
for ADIs, APRA recently completed its review of the 
capital requirements applicable to life and general 
insurers, which also came into effect on 1  January 
2013. As discussed in the previous Review, the new 
requirements aim to improve the risk sensitivity of 
the loss-absorbing capacity of insurers and better 
align the capital standards for insurers with those for 
other APRA-regulated industries. Following public 
consultation, APRA also finalised its prudential 
requirements for superannuation funds late last year 
and has now released prudential standards relating 
to governance, risk management, ‘fit and proper’ 
requirements, conflicts of interest and investments, 
among others. Most of the requirements in these 
new prudential standards will take effect from 1 July 
2013.
In January this year, APRA released a discussion 
paper and an amended draft prudential standard 
as part of its implementation of the payment, 
reporting and communications requirements of 
the Financial Claims Scheme (FCS). The discussion 
paper examines different payment options and the 
proposed requirements for ADIs to pre-position 
themselves so that depositors will have timely 
access to their guaranteed deposits in the event 
that the FCS is triggered. ADIs will be required to 
establish systems necessary to ‘operationalise’ the 
FCS should it be activated in the future, including 
the capacity to quickly generate necessary data 
and payment instructions for ADI customers. APRA 
intends to finalise the amended prudential standard 
by July 2013. ADIs are already required to have in 
place by 1  January 2014 the ‘single customer view’ 
(SCV) measures. (A SCV is a customer profile that 
aggregates the balances of all FCS-eligible deposit 
accounts held by each customer of an ADI for 
the purposes of calculating FCS payouts.) The full 
pre-position requirements are to be met by ADIs 
from 1 July 2014.
Regulation of market and payments 
infrastructure
The CFR, together with the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission, recently completed 
a review of competition issues in the clearing and 
settlement of the Australian cash equity market and 
the CFR’s conclusions were released and endorsed 
by the government in February. While the CFR 
remains open to competition and would expect 
competition to deliver efficient outcomes, one of 
the key conclusions of the review was that changing 
current arrangements now would raise industry’s 
costs, particularly in the short term, since system 
changes would be needed to allow participants 
to access multiple providers. The government 
accepted the CFR’s recommendation that a decision 
on any clearing and settlement facility licence 
application from a CCP seeking to compete in the 
Australian cash equity market be deferred for two 
years. In the meantime, in accordance with the 
CFR’s recommendations, the government has called 
upon the Australian Securities Exchange to work 
with industry stakeholders to develop a code 
of practice for clearing and settlement of cash 
equities in Australia, based on a set of principles 
relating to user input to governance, transparent 
and non-discriminatory pricing, and access. At the 
end of the two years, it is proposed that the CFR 
carry out a public review of the implementation 
and effectiveness of the code of practice. At the 
same time, the CFR would review the prospect 
of granting a licence to a competing CCP, or of 
pursuing other regulatory options aimed at ensuring 
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an efficient market. If competition were to be ruled 
out indefinitely, the CFR considers that a regulatory 
response might be appropriate.
ASIC released new competition market integrity 
rules to address issues arising from the operation of 
multiple exchanges. These rules form part of ASIC’s 
response to a trend towards more frequent, smaller 
trades away from public markets. Among other 
things, they are designed to address the impact 
of ‘dark pools’ and trading algorithms on market 
competition. Under the new rules, market operators 
are required to establish and maintain systems to 
identify and prevent anomalous orders entering 
the market by setting minimum and maximum 
price thresholds for each product quoted on their 
market. The new rules also seek to address concerns 
that dark trading undermines transparency and 
efficient pricing, as well as to encourage trading on 
exchanges. The package also includes additional data 
reporting requirements to assist ASIC in performing 
market surveillance. Following work by two task 
forces on the implications for market quality of dark 
liquidity and high-frequency trading, ASIC released 
a consultation paper in March, which proposes 
amended market integrity rules for these activities 
and seeks input on the likely impacts on costs 
and competition from the proposals. In a related 
development, the government recently announced 
a review of Australia’s financial market licensing 
regime. The review will examine the licensing of dark 
pools, and whether the market licensing regime 
is generally ‘fit for purpose’. As part of the review, 
the Treasury released a paper which considers the 
adequacy of current licensing arrangements and 
raises possible options for reform. It also reviews the 
regulation of non-market participant high-frequency 
traders.  R
65financial stability review |  m a r c h  2013
Copyright and Disclaimer Notices
hILDa
The following Disclaimer applies to data obtained 
from the HILDA Survey and reported in the chapter 
on ‘Business and Household Balance Sheets’ in this 
issue of the Review.
Disclaimer
The Household, Income and Labour Dynamics 
in Australia (HILDA) Survey was initiated and is 
funded by the Australian Government Department 
of Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA), and is managed by 
the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and 
Social Research (Melbourne Institute). Findings and 
views based on these data should not be attributed 
to either FaHCSIA or the Melbourne Institute.
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